Europese jurisprudentie · oorspronkelijke Engelse tekst
Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom | ECLI:CE:ECHR:2011:0628JUD000831907
Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens · 28 juni 2011 · aanvragen 8319/07 en 11449/07
Definitief geworden op 28 november 2011.
Officiële bron en oorspronkelijke PDF
Hieronder staat de oorspronkelijke Engelstalige uitspraak uit HUDOC, de officiële uitsprakendatabase van het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens. De tekst is uit de volledige PDF overgenomen en bevat oorspronkelijke Engelse paginakoppen en afbrekingen.
Download de oorspronkelijke Engelse PDF: 79 pagina’s, inclusief oorspronkelijke opmaak en kaartbijlage. De kaart staat op de laatste pagina van de PDF; de tekstweergave hieronder bevat alleen het bijschrift.
Volledige oorspronkelijke Engelse uitspraak
FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF SUFI AND ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
(Applications nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
28 June 2011
FINAL
28/11/2011
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 (c) of the Convention.
It may be subject to editorial revision.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PROCEDURE ................................................................................................1
THE FACTS...................................................................................................2
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE ...........................................2
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE............................5
III. RELEVANT EUROPEAN UNION LAW..........................................6
IV. RELEVANT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION........7
V. RELEVANT INFORMATION ABOUT SOMALIA..........................8
VI. RELEVANT CASE LAW ................................................................11
VII. RELEVANT COUNTRY INFORMATION ...................................19
THE LAW ....................................................................................................45
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF
THE CONVENTION..........................................................................45
1. General principles applicable in expulsion cases ......................49
2. The relationship between Article 3 of the Convention and
article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive................................51
3. The weight to be attached to the report of the fact-finding
mission to Nairobi ....................................................................53
4. The security situation in Mogadishu .........................................55
5. Conditions in southern and central Somalia
(outside Mogadishu) ..................................................................59
6. Summary of the Court’s conclusions.........................................70
7. Application of the aforementioned principles to the
applicants’ cases ........................................................................71
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION ...........74
III. RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT ..........................................75
UNHQ MAP OF SOMALIA .......................................................................77
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 1
In the case of Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a
Chamber composed of:
Lech Garlicki, President,
Nicolas Bratza,
Ljiljana Mijović,
Sverre Erik Jebens,
Päivi Hirvelä,
Ledi Bianku,
Vincent A. De Gaetano, judges,
and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 14 June 2011,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in two applications (nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07)
against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged
with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two
Somali nationals, Mr Abdisamad Adow Sufi and Mr Abdiaziz Ibrahim Elmi
(“the applicants”), on 21 February 2007 and 14 March 2007 respectively.
2. The applicants, who had been granted legal aid, were represented by
Ms N. Mole of the Aire Centre, a lawyer practising in London. The United
Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent,
Mr D. Walton of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
3. The applicants alleged that if returned to Somalia they would be at
real risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 and/or a violation of Article 2
of the Convention. They also complained that their removal would
disproportionately interfere with their rights under Article 8 of the
Convention.
4. On 23 February 2007 and 14 March 2007 the Acting President of the
Chamber to which the cases were allocated decided to apply Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, indicating to the Government that it was desirable in the
interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings that the
applicants should not be expelled to Somalia pending the Court’s decision.
The Court also decided to grant priority to the applications under Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court.
5. On 23 February 2007 and 26 March 2007 the Acting President of the
Fourth Section decided to give notice of the applications to the Government.
It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the
applications at the same time (Article 29 § 1).
2 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
6. The applicants and the Government each filed observations on the
admissibility and merits of the case (Rule 59 § 1).
7. At the Government’s request the cases were adjourned on 7 October
2008 pending the decision of the Court of Appeal in HH (Somalia),
AM (Somalia), J (Somalia) and MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the
Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 426. The adjournment was lifted
when the Court of Appeal delivered its judgment on 23 April 2010.
8. The applicants and the Government each filed further observations in
October 2010.
9. The Chamber decided to join the applications (Rule 42 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
10. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be
summarised as follows.
A. The first applicant
11. The first applicant, Mr Abdisamad Adow Sufi, is a Somali national
who was born in 1987 and is currently in detention in an Immigration
Detention Centre in West Drayton.
12. On 30 September 2003 he entered the United Kingdom clandestinely
using false travel documents. On 3 October 2003 he claimed asylum on the
ground that as a member of the Reer-Hamar, a sub-clan of the minority
Ahansi clan, he had been subjected to persecution by Hawiye militia, who
had killed his father and sister and seriously injured him. As a consequence,
he had no surviving relatives in Somalia.
13. On 15 April 2005 the Secretary of State for the Home Department
refused the first applicant’s asylum application, finding, inter alia, that the
fact he had remained in Somalia until 2003 undermined his claim to be a
member of a minority clan. On 16 May 2005 he appealed against the refusal
of the application on both asylum and human rights grounds, namely
Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. On 29 June 2005 both the asylum appeal
and the human rights appeal were dismissed by an Adjudicator who found
that his account of what had happened to him in Somalia was not credible.
14. On 7 October 2005 the first applicant pleaded guilty to two offences
of burglary, five offences of dishonestly obtaining goods by deception and
one offence of attempting to dishonestly obtain goods by deception.
On 29 November 2005 he was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment.
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 3
On 14 February 2006 he was convicted, inter alia, of threats to kill and was
sentenced to a further six months’ detention at a Young Offender
Institution. He was later sentenced to three months’ imprisonment following
a conviction for indecent exposure in October 2007 and to thirty-two
months’ imprisonment following a conviction for five counts of burglary
and theft and two counts of attempted burglary in July 2009.
15. On 15 July 2006 the first applicant was served with a decision to
make a deportation order, in which the Secretary of State noted the
seriousness of his offences and the need to protect the public from serious
crime and its effects. He also noted that he was 19 years of age, in good
health and single. Although he had been resident in the United Kingdom for
almost two years, he had spent his youth and formative years in Somalia. In
the circumstances, it would not be unreasonable to expect him to readjust to
life there. The Secretary of State for the Home Department also considered
Article 8 of the Convention but concluded that the first applicant’s
deportation would not constitute a disproportionate interference with his
right to respect for his family and private life.
16. On 4 September 2006 his appeal against the Secretary of State’s
decision was rejected by an Immigration Judge. On 1 November 2006 a
deportation order against the first applicant was signed and an application
for judicial review of the deportation decision was refused in January 2007.
17. On 27 February 2007 the Court granted the first applicant interim
measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to prevent his removal to
Somalia prior to the Court’s consideration of his application.
B. The second applicant
18. The second applicant, Mr Abdiaziz Ibrahim Elmi, is a Somali
national who was born in 1969 and is currently detained in an Immigration
Detention Centre.
19. He was born in Hargeisa, which is now the capital of the
self-declared state of Somaliland. When he was two years of age, his family
moved to Mogadishu and he never returned to the north of the country.
20. His father, a high-ranking officer in the army during the Barré
regime, was appointed to the Somali Embassy in London as a military
attaché in 1988. The second applicant joined him in the United Kingdom on
18 October 1988 and was given six months’ leave to enter.
On 1 March 1989 his father died. On 26 April 1989 the second applicant
made an application for asylum based on his father’s position in the Somali
army and the beginning of the civil war in Somalia. On 31 October 1989 he
was recognised as a refugee and granted leave to remain until
31 October 1993. On 7 January 1994 he was granted Indefinite Leave to
Remain in the United Kingdom.
4 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
21. The second applicant was convicted of a road traffic offence in
June 1992. On 8 March 1996 he was sentenced to a total of five years and
six months’ imprisonment by a Crown Court for handling stolen goods,
obtaining property by deception, robbery and possessing an imitation
firearm while committing an offence. On 13 November 2000 he was
convicted of perverting the course of justice and sentenced to three months’
imprisonment. In the same year he was convicted on further counts of theft
and road traffic offences. On 16 March 2001 he was convicted of theft by a
Magistrates’ Court and placed on a curfew. On 7 June 2001 he was again
convicted of theft and sentenced to 3 months’ imprisonment.
On 23 May 2002 he was convicted by a Crown Court on eight counts of
supplying class A drugs (cocaine and heroin) and on 7 November 2002 he
was sentenced to 42 months’ imprisonment. On an unspecified date the
second applicant was released on licence. On 21 June 2004 he was
sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment by a Crown Court for burglary and
theft.
22. On 21 June 2006 a decision was made to issue a deportation order by
virtue of section 3(5) of the Immigration Act 1971 and the second applicant
was invited to rebut the presumption that his continued presence in the
United Kingdom constituted a danger to the community.
23. He accepted that he was a drug addict but submitted that he did not
constitute a danger to the community because he had made efforts to
overcome his addiction and had recognised his past wrongdoings. However,
on 4 September 2006 the Secretary of State for the Home Department found
that he had failed to demonstrate that he would not constitute such a danger.
In respect of his rights under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, the
Secretary of State found that even though he had been living in the United
Kingdom and could be identified as such he would not be at risk on return
to Somalia as he was a member of the Isaaq, a majority clan. In respect of
his rights under Article 8 of the Convention, the Secretary of State accepted
that he had family ties with his three sisters and his mother in the United
Kingdom but did not consider that these relationships constituted family life
for the purposes of Article 8 as there was no evidence of dependency going
beyond the normal emotional ties. The Secretary of State therefore
concluded that his removal would not violate Articles 2, 3 or 8 of the
Convention.
24. On 27 October 2006 the second applicant’s appeal against the
decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department was refused by
the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (“AIT”), which considered that he
could obtain clan protection in any part of Somalia as he was a member of a
majority clan. Although the AIT accepted that he would not find support in
relation to his drug dependency in Somalia, it found that this did not suffice
to rebut the presumption in favour of deportation. As to his Article 8 claim,
the second applicant had not shown that family life existed amongst his
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 5
adult siblings and, even if it did, he had not shown that his circumstances
were “truly exceptional so that his removal would violate his Article 8
rights”. Finally, the AIT noted that the sale of drugs posed a danger to the
community and there was a real likelihood of the second applicant
re-offending.
25. A deportation order against the second applicant was signed on
8 January 2007 and on 6 March 2007 he was served with removal
directions. On 14 March 2007 he requested, and was granted, interim
measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to prevent his removal before
his application was considered by the Court.
26. On 3 March 2008 the second applicant was convicted of possession
of a Class A controlled drug with intent to supply and was sentenced to
eighteen months’ imprisonment. On 8 July 2010 he was again charged with
possession of a Class A drug with intent to supply. A hearing has not yet
taken place.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
27. At the material time, following the refusal of an asylum application
by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, an applicant had a right
of appeal to the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (“the AIT”). Section
103A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (as inserted by
section 81(6) of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.)
Act 2004) provided that a party to an appeal to the AIT could apply for an
order that the AIT reconsider its decision on appeal on the ground that it had
made a material error of law.
28. Once the appeal process against the refusal of an asylum application
had been exhausted, an applicant could continue to make further
submissions to the Secretary of State for the Home Department. Paragraph
353 of the Immigration Rules (HC 395, as amended by HC 1112) stated
that:
“When a human rights or asylum claim has been refused and any appeal relating to
that claim is no longer pending, the decision maker will consider any further
submissions and, if rejected, will then determine whether they amount to a fresh
claim. The submissions will amount to a fresh claim if they are significantly different
from the material that has previously been considered. The submissions will only be
significantly different if the content:
(i) had not already been considered; and
(ii) taken together with the previously considered material, created a realistic
prospect of success, notwithstanding its rejection.”
29. Where a person was not granted leave to enter the United Kingdom,
he or she could be subject to administrative removal pursuant to paragraph 8
of Schedule 2 of the Immigration Act 1971. Pursuant to section 3(5) of the
6 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
1971 Act, the Secretary of State also had power to deport any person who
was not a British citizen on the ground that his deportation would be
“conducive to the public good”.
III. RELEVANT EUROPEAN UNION LAW
30. Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum
standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or
stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international
protection and the content of the protection granted (“the Qualification
Directive”) has the objective, inter alia, of ensuring European Union (“EU”)
Member States apply common criteria for the identification of persons
genuinely in need of international protection (recital six of the preamble).
In addition to regulating refugee status, it makes provision for granting
subsidiary protection status. Article 2(e) defines a person eligible for
subsidiary protection status as someone who would face a real risk of
suffering serious harm if returned to his or her country of origin. Serious
harm is defined in article 15 as consisting of: (a) death penalty or execution;
(b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant
in the country of origin; or (c) serious and individual threat to a civilian’s
life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of
international or internal armed conflict.
31. On 17 October 2007 the Dutch Administrative Jurisdiction Division
of the Council of State (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van
State), when considering the case of M. and N. Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris
van Justitie (the Deputy Minister of Justice), lodged a reference for a
preliminary ruling with the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) asking, inter
alia, whether article 15(c) of the Directive offered supplementary or other
protection to Article 3 of the Convention.
32. The ECJ held that article 15(c) protection went beyond that of
Article 3 of the Convention, which was covered by article 15(b) of the
Qualification Directive. The ECJ summarised the criteria to be applied as
follows:
“Article 15(c) of the Directive, in conjunction with article 2(e) of the Directive,
must be interpreted as meaning that the existence of a serious and individual threat to
the life or person of an applicant for subsidiary protection is not subject to the
condition that that applicant adduce evidence that he is specifically targeted by reason
of factors particular to his personal circumstances, and the existence of such a threat
can exceptionally be considered to be established where the degree of indiscriminate
violence characterising the armed conflict taking place ... reaches such a high level
that substantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian, returned to the
relevant country or as the case may be, to the relevant region, would, solely on
account of his presence on the territory of that country or region, face a real risk of
being subject to that threat.”
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 7
33. In QD (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009]
EWCA Civ 620 the Court of Appeal observed that the ECJ in Elgafaji had
not introduced an additional test of exceptionality, but had simply stressed
that not every armed conflict or violent situation would attract the protection
of article 15(c). A conflict or violent situation would only attract the
protection of article 15(c) where the level of violence was such that, without
anything to render them a particular target, civilians faced real risks to their
lives or personal safety.
34. More recently, in the case of HM and Others (Article 15(c)) Iraq CG
[2010] UKUT 331, the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
did not consider it helpful to attempt to distinguish between a real risk of
civilian deaths as a result of targeted attacks and a real risk as a result of
incidental attacks. In the Tribunal’s opinion, the nexus between the
generalised armed conflict and the indiscriminate violence posing a real risk
to life and person was met when the intensity of the conflict involved means
of combat, whether permissible under the laws or not, that seriously
endangered non-combatants as well as to result in such a general breakdown
of law and order as to permit anarchy and criminality occasioning the
serious harm referred to in the Directive.
IV. RELEVANT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
35. It is a well-established principle that persons will generally not be in
need of asylum or subsidiary protection if they could obtain protection by
moving elsewhere in their own country. This principle is reflected both in
article 8 of the Qualification Directive and paragraph 339O of the
Immigration Rules HC 395 (as amended), both of which provide that an
applicant is not in need of international protection if there is a part of the
country of origin where there is no well-founded fear of persecution or real
risk of suffering serious harm, and where the applicant can reasonably be
expected to stay.
36. In the cases of Januzi, Hamid, Gaafar and Mohammed v Secretary
of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 5 and AH (Sudan)
v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 the House
of Lords held that the decision-maker, taking account of all relevant
circumstances pertaining to the applicant and his country of origin, must
decide whether it is reasonable to expect the applicant to relocate or whether
it would be unduly harsh to expect him to do so. In this regard, the relevant
comparison was between the conditions which prevailed in the place of
relocation and those which prevailed elsewhere in the country of his
nationality, including in his former place of habitual residence. If the
applicant could live a relatively normal life in the place of relocation,
judged by the standards which prevailed in his country of nationality
generally, and if he could reach the less hostile part without undue hardship
8 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
or undue difficulty, it would not be unreasonable to expect him to move
there. However, the more closely the persecution was linked to the State,
and the greater the control of the State over those acting or purporting to act
on its behalf, the more likely (other things being equal) that a victim of
persecution in one place would be similarly vulnerable in another place
within the same State.
V. RELEVANT INFORMATION ABOUT SOMALIA
A. Factual background
37. The factual background to the conflict in Somalia, as described in
the country reports at paragraphs 80 – 188 below and subsequently agreed
by the parties, is as follows.
38. Somalia is comprised of three autonomous areas: the self-declared
Republic of Somaliland in the north west, the state of Puntland in the north
east, and the remaining southern and central regions. Somali society has
traditionally been characterised by membership of clan families, which are
subdivided into clans and sub-clans. The four majority clans are Darod,
Hawiye, Isaaq and Dir. In addition there are a number of minority groups,
which are also divided into sub-groups. The Digli and Mirifle take an
intermediate position between the majority clans and the minority groups.
39. Somalia has been without a functioning central government since the
overthrow of President Siad Barre by opposing clans in 1991. The clans
could not agree on a replacement and lawlessness, civil conflict and clan
warfare followed. Mogadishu was fragmented into rival, clan-based factions
and control of the city was divided among warlords. The Transitional
Federal Government was established in October 2004 but a combination of
internal divisions within the Transitional Federal Government and
insecurity in central and southern Somalia hindered it from becoming a
functioning Government. In June 2006 the Union of Islamic Courts, a union
of various Sharia courts, took control of Mogadishu. Following a period of
fighting against a coalition of warlords called the Alliance for the
Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism, the Union of Islamic Courts
took control of most of central and southern Somalia. United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1725 (2006) authorised the deployment of an
African Union and Intergovernmental Authority on Development force to
protect the Transitional Federal Government. Ethiopian ground and air
forces also moved into Somalia to support the Transitional Federal
Government and by late December 2006 the Union of Islamic Courts had
been ousted from Mogadishu and much of southern Somalia. Remnants of
the Union of Islamic Courts withdrew to the southern reaches of the Lower
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 9
Juba region where they continued to fight against the Transitional Federal
Government and Ethiopian troops.
40. After the fall of the Union of Islamic Courts, the semblance of order
and security that it had created in Mogadishu deteriorated. Roadblocks and
checkpoints returned, as did banditry and violence. Furthermore, attacks by
anti-government elements on Transitional Federal Government and
Ethiopian forces continued in Mogadishu, with civilians frequently caught
up in the fighting. Homes and public infrastructure were destroyed and a
significant part of the civilian population was displaced. The fall of the
Union of Islamic Courts also bought to the fore some of the inter- and intra-
clan rivalries that had been suppressed during the conflict and serious clan
related fighting ensued.
41. In 2007 the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia was created
when Somali Islamists and opposition leaders joined forces to fight the
Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian forces.
42. On 20 August 2008 the Transitional Federal Government and the
opposition Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia signed a ceasefire
agreement in Djibouti. At the same time, the United Nations Security
Council extended the mandate of the African Union peacekeeping mission
in Somalia. However, the Islamic insurgents at the heart of the escalation in
violence were not party to the ceasefire agreement, and instead indicated
that they would continue to fight until Ethiopian forces withdrew from
Somalia.
43. By late 2008 Islamist insurgents, including a group called
al-Shabaab, had regained control of most of southern Somalia.
44. Somalia’s Parliament met in Djibouti in January 2009 and swore in
149 new members from the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia. The
Parliament also extended the mandate of the Transitional Federal
Government for another two years and installed moderate Islamist Sheikh
Sharif Sheikh Ahmad as the new President.
45. Ethiopia pulled its troops out of Somalia in January 2009. Soon
after, al-Shabaab took control of Baidoa, formerly a key stronghold of the
Transitional Federal Government. In May 2009 Islamist insurgents launched
an attack on Mogadishu, prompting President Ahmad to appeal for help
from abroad.
46. In October 2009 al-Shabaab consolidated its position as the most
powerful insurgent group by driving its main rival, Hizbul Islam, out of the
southern port city of Kismayo. Since then it has openly declared its alliance
with al-Qaeda and has been steadily moving forces up towards Mogadishu.
47. In December 2010 Hizbul Islam and al-Shabaab merged.
10 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
B. Parties to the conflict
1. The Transitional Federal Government
48. The Transitional Federal Government is recognised by the United
Nations and almost all key foreign powers as the legitimate government of
Somalia. However, it currently controls only a small section of Mogadishu
centred on the port, the airport and the presidential palace. It is largely
dependent on African Union troops for its survival.
2. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
49. AMISOM is an African Union force authorised by the UN Security
Council and deployed to Mogadishu to support the Transitional Federal
Government. It currently consists of 5,300 Ugandan and Burundian troops.
3. Ethiopian forces
50. Ethiopian forces joined the conflict in 2006 to help drive out the
Union of Islamic Courts. They remained in Somalia until their withdrawal
at the beginning of 2009.
4. Al-Shabaab
51. Al-Shabaab began as part of the armed wing of the Union of Islamic
Courts. When the 2006 Ethiopian military intervention sent the leaders of
the Union of Islamic Courts into exile, a hard core of al-Shabaab fighters
remained in Somalia to fight. In their April 2010 report, “Harsh War, Harsh
Peace”, Human Rights Watch indicated that al-Shabaab was an alliance of
factions rather than a single entity, but the group’s diverse leaders had a
common agenda: defeating AMISOM and the Transitional Federal
Government and extending Sharia law across Somalia. Some of its leaders
have links with al-Qaeda although the extent of al-Qaeda’s influence over
al-Shabaab remains unclear.
52. Al-Shabaab has emerged as the most powerful and effective armed
faction on the ground, especially in southern Somalia. They have received
material support from the Eritrean government, which is eager to undercut
Ethiopia’s interests in the region. By the end of 2009 al-Shabaab controlled
more territory than any other faction in Somalia, including Baidoa, the
former seat of the Transitional Federal Government parliament, Jowhar,
which had been one of the Transitional Federal Government President’s
most reliable strongholds, and the strategic port of Kismayo.
53. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for twin suicide bombings in the
Ugandan capital Kampala on 11 July 2010, which killed 79 people watching
the World Cup soccer final on television. It was al-Shabaab’s first attack
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 11
outside Somalia and heightened concerns about its ability to carry out more
attacks in the region and beyond.
5. Hizbul Islam
54. Hizbul Islam is another armed group which has both a Sharia agenda
and the goal of driving AMISOM and the Transitional Federal Government
from Mogadishu. In early 2009 it entered into an alliance with al-Shabaab
but the alliance came to an end in October 2009 during the fight for
Kismayo. In December 2010, however, it once again merged with
al-Shabaab.
6. Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca
55. Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca is an Islamist group which professes to
support a more moderate agenda. The group exists primarily in central
Somalia, where it has maintained control over large strips of territory,
predominantly in Galgadud and Hiran regions.
56. In February 2010 Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca signed a power-sharing
and military unification pact with the Transitional Federal Government,
although at times relations between the two groups were strained.
VI. RELEVANT CASE LAW
A. NM and others (Lone women – Ashraf) Somalia CG [2005] UKAIT
00076
57. In NM and others (Lone women – Ashraf) Somalia CG [2005]
UKAIT 00076 the AIT found that conditions in southern Somalia and
particularly in and around Mogadishu were such that both men and women
from minority clans were in danger of Article 3 ill-treatment and should be
regarded as refugees in the absence of evidence of a clan or personal patron
which could protect them. Men and women from majority clans were not
likely to be in need of international protection, although individual
circumstances required separate consideration. Although women were at
greater risk than men, they would not be able to show that, simply as lone
female returnees from the United Kingdom, they had no place of clan
safety. Finally, the AIT held that the general conditions of life or
circumstances in Somalia did not engage the obligations of the Refugee
Convention or engage Article 3 of the Convention for all female returnees.
A differential impact had to be shown. Being a single woman was not of
itself a sufficient differentiator.
58. The AIT observed in passing that, on the strength of the background
evidence and the expert evidence given at the hearing, it would consider that
12 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
any person at real risk on return of being compelled to live in an IDP camp
would have little difficulty in making out a claim under Article 3, if not
under the Refugee Convention.
B. HH & Others (Mogadishu: armed conflict: risk) Somalia CG [2008]
UKAIT 00022
59. In HH & others (Mogadishu: armed conflict: risk) Somalia CG
[2008] UKAIT 00022 the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal held that for
the purposes of article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, a situation of
internal armed conflict existed in Mogadishu. The AIT held, however, that
while all sides to the conflict had acted from time to time in such a way as
to cause harm to civilians, they were not in general engaging in
indiscriminate violence and, as a consequence, a person would not be at real
risk of serious harm by reason only of his or her presence in that zone or
area.
60. The AIT found that although clan support networks were strained,
they had not yet collapsed. Majority clans continued to have arms, even
though their militias no longer controlled the city. A person from a majority
clan, or whose background disclosed a significant degree of assimilation
with, or acceptance by, a majority clan would in general be able to rely on
that clan for support and assistance, including at times of displacement.
A member of a minority clan or group who had no identifiable home area
where majority clan support could be found would in general be at real risk
of serious harm of being targeted by criminal elements, both in any area of
former residence and in the likely event of being displaced. Members of
minority groups found it harder to flee and move around to escape fighting,
because they were not so easily accepted in new surroundings. The AIT
found that persons displaced from their home in Mogadishu without being
able to find a place elsewhere with clan members or friends would likely
have to spend a significant period of time in a makeshift shelter, such as
those along the road to Afgooye, or in an IDP camp, and could well
experience treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention.
61. Finally, the AIT held that the issue of whether a person from a
minority clan would be able to find majority clan support would often need
specific and detailed consideration. The evidence suggested that certain
minority groups could be accepted by the majority clan of the area in
question, so as to call on protection from that clan. On the current evidence,
it might not be appropriate to assume that a finding of minority group status
in southern Somalia was in itself sufficient to entitle a person to
international protection, particularly where a person’s credibility was
otherwise lacking.
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 13
C. AM & AM (armed conflict: risk categories) Somalia CG [2008]
UKAIT 00091
62. In its most recent Somali Country Guidance determination, the
Asylum and Immigration Tribunal found that since its decision in HH there
had been a number of significant changes in Somalia.
63. First, the AIT found that by mid-2008 the armed conflict had spread
beyond Mogadishu and its environs. The AIT therefore found that a
situation of internal armed conflict existed throughout central and southern
Somalia. In respect of the intensity of the violence, the AIT noted that
“manifestly all significant armed parties to the conflict have engaged in
indiscriminate attacks”. In particular, it noted that the Ethiopians were
reported to have used means of war (firing inherently indiscriminate
Katyusha rockets in urban areas) and methods of warfare (using mortars and
indirect weapons without guidance in urban areas) that violated
International Humanitarian Law. The TGF were reported to have engaged in
aggression against civilians and to have acted “as if they believe that they
are immune from accountability, investigation or prosecution, including for
crimes under international law”. Moreover, reports indicated that insurgents
had perpetrated raids, robberies and other abuses against civilians, including
rape and other forms of sexual violence. The AIT referred to information
received from the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (“IASC”) which
expressed concerns about:
“indiscriminate bombardment of civilian areas; indiscriminate use of roadside
bombs and mortars from and in civilian areas; indiscriminate shooting in response to
roadside bombs; arbitrary arrest and detention of civilians, including children; forced
evictions; forced recruitment, including of children; sexual and gender based violence;
intimidation and assassination of journalists, aid workers and civilian officials; and
extra-judicial killings.”
64. The AIT also noted that the worsening security situation was
coupled with a deteriorating humanitarian situation. It observed that
between 400,000 and 750,000 people had been displaced from Mogadishu
and that there had been significant displacements from other towns to which
armed clashes had spread. The AIT also observed first, that IDPs
experienced serious problems while on the move, which included
checkpoints, threats, intimidation, looting, rape, abduction and harassment;
secondly, that many did not end up in camps or makeshift settlements and
consequently struggled to obtain shelter, food, water and sanitation; and
thirdly, that the effect of displacement appeared to reduce the ability of
IDPs to count on protection from their own clan: even where they fled to a
traditional area for their clan, the pressures of numbers and scarce resources
could mean that newcomers were not supported or absorbed by the local
community.
65. With regard to the situation in Mogadishu, the AIT considered that:
14 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
“the movements of population out of Mogadishu in the past two years have been
unprecedented. UN sources have estimated (at various times) that 400,000, up to as
many as 750,000 (or around one third to a half), of the population of Mogadishu have
been displaced. An 8 April 2008 Voice of America report states that two thirds of
Mogadishu has been turned into an urban battleground. Since the beginning of 2008
there have been significantly fewer returns. Whatever the precise figures, it is clear
that the ongoing violence has forced substantial numbers to flee the city more than
once and flight seems an ongoing process: the IRIN report of 29 September 2008 cites
Elman estimates that 18,500 people recently fled their homes due to the fighting and
shelling (COIS, A 4). The COIS Reply dated 24 October 2008 states that:
“[a]ccording to the UNHCR an estimated 5,500 people were displaced from the city
during the week and over 61,000 since 21 September 2008”. Armed clashes have
increasingly destroyed housing, market areas (Bakara market has been deliberately
shelled) and infrastructure and the recent closure of the airport is likely to make
matters in Mogadishu worse. According to Grayson and Munk, the aid community has
been largely ineffective in providing the necessary aid to those who have stayed in
Mogadishu (Nairobi evidence 65). They also state that Mogadishu is a “ghost town”
and that only the most vulnerable remain there.”
66. It concluded that since HH the situation in Mogadishu had changed
significantly, both in terms of the extent of population displacement away
from the city, the intensity of the fighting and the security conditions there.
On the available evidence the AIT considered that Mogadishu was no
longer safe as a place to live for the great majority of its citizens. It did not
rule out that there might be certain individuals who on the facts might be
considered to be able to live safely in the city, for example if they had close
connections with powerful actors in Mogadishu, such as prominent
businessmen or senior figures in the insurgency or in powerful criminal
gangs. However, barring cases of this kind, in the case of persons found to
come from Mogadishu who were returnees from the United Kingdom, the
AIT found that they would face on return a real risk of persecution or
serious harm and it was reasonably likely, if they tried staying there, that
they would soon be forced to leave or that they would decide not to try to
live there in the first place.
67. Nevertheless, the AIT were not persuaded that the situation in
central and southern Somalia had reached the threshold where civilians per
se or Somali civilian IDPs per se could be said to face a real risk of
persecution, serious harm or treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the
Convention. First, although the levels of violence had increased in intensity,
the numbers of those killed and wounded was not of great magnitude.
Secondly, while the humanitarian situation was dire, it did not appear that
civilians per se faced a real risk of denial of basic food and shelter and other
bare necessities of life. Thirdly, while there was evidence of attacks on
IDPs, in view of the huge numbers of people displaced (over a million
according to some reports), it appeared that the great majority of IDPs were
able to travel and subsist in IDP camps or settlements without serious
setbacks.
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 15
68. Rather, the AIT assessment of the extent to which IDPs would face
greater or lesser hardships, at least outside Mogadishu, would vary
depending on a number of factors. In particular, the AIT noted that IDPs
from more influential clans appeared to have a better chance of being
tolerated in the area to which they fled; IDPs with a traditional clan area that
they could travel to, especially if they had close relatives or close clan
affiliations in that area, appeared to have better prospects of finding safety
and support (although not if the area concerned was already saturated with
fellow IDPs); those who lacked recent experience of living in Somalia
appeared more likely to have difficulty dealing with the changed
environment in which clan loyalties had to some extent fractured; persons
returning to their home area from the United Kingdom could be perceived
as having relative wealth and might be more susceptible to extortion,
abduction and the like; those who lived in areas not particularly affected by
the fighting and which were not seen as strategically important to any of the
main parties to the conflict would appear less subject to security problems;
women and girls faced the additional risks of rape, abduction and
harassment; the prevailing economic conditions in the area would also be
relevant, bearing in mind Somalia’s history of droughts, poor harvests and
rising food prices.
69. The AIT recognised that there had been a significant change in the
clan-based character of Somali society since HH was promulgated. Clan
protection was not as effective as it had been in the early 1990s and
conflicts over scarce resources had complicated the situation and made it
unpredictable. This did not mean, however, that the clan or sub-clan had
ceased to be the primary entity to which individuals turned for protection.
70. As regards internal relocation, whether those whose home area was
Mogadishu (or indeed any other part of central and southern Somalia)
would be able to relocate in safety and without undue hardship would
depend on the evidence as to the general circumstances in the relevant parts
of central and southern Somalia and the personal circumstances of the
applicant. Whether or not it was likely that relocation would mean that they
had to live in an IDP camp would be an important but not necessarily a
decisive factor.
71. The AIT considered the safety of en route travel from Mogadishu
International Airport, which was the point of return for anyone being
removed to central and southern Somalia. The AIT noted that:
“The airport is one of the facilities patrolled by AMISON troops (COIS, 27.13).
According to Somalia Humanitarian Overview, September 2008, normally at least
5 commercial flights arrive and depart on a weekly basis to and from the rest of
Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti and Dubai. The COIS Reply of 24 October 2008 notes that
it is expected in the next month or so that thousands will leave via MIA to perform
Haj in Saudi Arabia. At the time of HH, the airport was fully operational with flights
arriving and departing regularly. However in 2008 the situation has been unsettled.
There were attacks of some kind in January 2008 and the downing of a plane by a
16 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
missile in March 2008 (COIS, 27.13). The airport was attacked by insurgents on
1 June 2008 as the President’s plane left for talks in Djibouti. On 14 September 2008
a group identifying themselves as Al Shabab threatened to shut the airport down,
although a counter-report from Union of Islamic Courts said that the Islamist forces
did not intend to close it. It was closed on 16 September. On 28 September there were
mortar attacks on it upon the arrival of an AMISON military plane (COIS, A.2).
A Press TV cutting dated 2 October 2008 states that 5 heavy mortars landed inside
MIA injuring a number of soldiers. The assailants apparently targeted a plane trying to
land. A COIS Reply dated 15 October 2008 reports an Al Shabab source as saying
that on 9 October a civilian plane carrying 120 Somali deportees from Saudi Arabia
managed to land without incident. A 13 October press report refers to several mortar
attacks on the airport. We were told by the respondent at the outset of the hearing that
removals to Somalia were temporarily suspended because of travel documentation
problems, but it may well be, in the light of these recent developments, that for the
immediate future at least, there would be difficulties in ensuring safe arrival in any
event.”
72. In HH the AIT had concluded that those moving around Mogadishu
and the environs would in general not be at risk of serious harm at
checkpoints, although it left open the possibility that the situation might be
different if a person were likely to encounter a non-Transitional Federal
Government checkpoint alone, without friends, family or other clan
members. However, in AM the AIT noted that from the second half of 2007
United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
estimate of the number of roadblocks/checkpoints in central and southern
Somalia showed an increase from 238 in July 2007 to 400 in July 2008 and
considerably more than half were under the control of insurgents.
Nevertheless, while the AIT found that the Transitional Federal Government
appeared by and large to have lost control of many of the roadblocks and
checkpoints in central and southern Somalia, the evidence continued to
indicate that they retained control of the main road from the airport into
Mogadishu. While there was some evidence that the road came under attack
from insurgents on a daily basis, there was clearly a great deal of ongoing
movement of people along the roads in central and southern Somalia and in
and around the airport and the AIT did not consider that the available
evidence demonstrated a real risk en route of persecution or serious harm
for travellers from the airport to Mogadishu.
D. HH (Somalia), AM (Somalia), J (Somalia) and MA (Somalia)
v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA
Civ 426
73. One of the applicants in HH and one of the applicants in AM were
granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. Their appeals were joined to
those of two other Somali applicants.
74. HH contended that the AIT had erred in its application of the
provisions of article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive as it had held first,
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 17
that the notion of an “individual threat” required a “differential impact ” and
secondly, that article 15(c) did not add anything to Articles 2 and 3 of the
Convention. Before the Court of Appeal, the Secretary of State for the
Home Department accepted that the AIT had erred in its interpretation of
article 15(c), but submitted that the error was not material. The Court of
Appeal held that if the correct (post-Elgafaji) approach to article 15(c) had
been applied to the facts found by the AIT, it was inevitable that it would
have found that the population of Mogadishu as a whole was not subject to
such a high level of indiscriminate violence as to justify the conclusion that
merely to be there attracted entitlement to subsidiary protection.
Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed HH’s appeal on the ground
that the error of law was not material.
75. The AIT had accepted that AM was from Jowhar. It noted that there
was no longer any significant fighting there but accepted that there was
evidence that en route travel to Jowhar was hazardous. Nevertheless, the
AIT held that it was not empowered to consider the risk faced in making the
journey: rather, it was for the Secretary of State for the Home Department,
in finalising the removal arrangements, to satisfy herself that there would be
safe en route travel for AM. AM appealed to the Court of Appeal on the
ground that this was not a lawful approach. The Court of Appeal allowed
the appeal, finding that in any case in which it could be shown either
directly or by implication what route and method of return was envisaged,
the AIT was required by law to consider and determine any challenge to the
safety of that route or method. The AIT therefore fell into error as it had
declined to consider AM’s safety on return. The Court of Appeal remitted
the case to the AIT to consider this issue.
76. J had sought judicial review of the Secretary of State for the Home
Department’s refusal to accept as a fresh claim her submissions about the
situation facing her were she to be returned to Somalia. The Administrative
Court had held that if the removal directions had indicated that J was
expected to go by road from Mogadishu International Airport to her home
town, the evidence would have given her a strongly arguable case for
judicial review. However, as the detail or method of return was neither
clearly nor necessarily implicit within the immigration decision, the judicial
review application had been refused. J appealed to the Court of Appeal. For
the same reasons adopted in AM’s case, the Court of Appeal allowed the
appeal. The Court of Appeal indicated (on an obiter basis) that the
Qualification Directive and the Asylum Procedures Directive read together
required that the issues of safety during return (as opposed to technical
obstacles during return) should be considered as part of the decision on
entitlement. Only technical obstacles could legitimately be deferred to the
point at which removal directions were being made or considered. If there
was a real issue of safety on return the Secretary of State had to engage with
it in his decision on entitlement to protection. If he failed to do so, the
18 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
appeal tribunal would have to deal with the issue. In any case, the decision
on entitlement had to be made within a reasonable time and could not be left
until the Secretary of State was in a position to set safe removal directions.
77. MA appealed against the rejection of his Article 3 claims by the
AIT. In particular, he complained that the AIT had misdirected itself
because it had focused on his failure to tell the truth when it should have
asked whether there was evidence relating to his own particular situation,
even ignoring his own rejected testimony, which would support his
contention that there was a real risk on return. The Court of Appeal accepted
that the AIT had adopted the wrong approach, apparently considering that
the applicant’s lies had disabled it from reaching a conclusion on the Article
3 risk. Had it made an assessment on the basis of the available evidence, it
would have had to have concluded that the applicant was at risk of Article 3
ill-treatment on return. The Court of Appeal noted that following AM, the
Country Guidance relating to Mogadishu was such that most potential
returnees would be entitled to subsidiary protection under article 15 of the
Qualification Directive. It therefore followed that only those Somalis who
could get without undue risk to a place of safety or who had access to
protection against the endemic dangers could properly be deported or
returned. It was accepted that MA was from a minority clan, that he had not
been in Somalia for 15 years, and that for much of that time he had been in
detention. There was therefore sufficient evidence before the AIT to at least
establish a real risk that he would not have the necessary contacts in
Mogadishu to afford him the necessary protection.
E. AM (Evidence – route of return) Somalia [2011] UKUT (IAC)
78. In AM (Evidence – route of return) Somalia [2011] UKUT (IAC)
the Upper Tribunal held that the First Tier Tribunal had failed to give
adequate reasons for concluding that the applicant could safely reach his
home area of Afgooye from Mogadishu International Airport. However, on
reconsideration the Tribunal was not satisfied that returning him would give
rise to a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. In particular, it found that
travel took place with some degree of frequency from the airport to the city
of Mogadishu and into other areas of Somalia; that as the applicant had
lived in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, he would be well able to anticipate and
comply with the requirements of al-Shabaab; that there was nothing which
would put him at any risk were he to encounter a Transitional Federal
Government checkpoint; that the evidence did not support a finding that all
men or young men were at risk of forced recruitment by al-Shabaab; and,
that as the applicant was not found to be a minority clan member, and as his
uncle had been able to fund his departure from Somalia, he would be able to
avoid foreseeable risks and pay the relatively modest sums demanded at
checkpoints.
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 19
F. Judgment of 24 February 2011 (UM 10061-09) of the Swedish
Migration Court of Appeal (Migrationsöverdomstolen)
79. The Swedish Migration Court of Appeal, which is the court of final
instance in immigration cases, found that a situation of internal armed
conflict existed throughout the whole of southern and central Somalia which
was sufficiently serious to expose the Somali applicant to a risk of serious
harm, even though he could not demonstrate that he would be specifically
targeted. The court had regard to many reports which indicated that the
fighting had increased in recent months and that the situation had become
very unstable and unpredictable. Moreover, due to the worsening security
situation, the presence of the United Nations and other international
organisations had decreased and, as a consequence, detailed and updated
information was hard to come by. Although the safety level in Somaliland
and Puntland was considered to be acceptable, a Somali returnee could only
gain admittance to those areas if he was seen as belonging or having another
connection to them. As that was not the case with the applicant, the court
concluded that he could not internally relocate and that he should thus be
given a residence permit and subsidiary protection in Sweden.
VII. RELEVANT COUNTRY INFORMATION
A. United Kingdom Government Reports
1. Somalia: Report of Fact-Finding Mission to Nairobi,
8 – 15 September 2010
80. The fact-finding mission interviewed a number of anonymous
sources, including international NGOs, security advisors and diplomatic
sources, about the current security and humanitarian situation in southern
and central Somalia. In particular, the mission sought to obtain information
on which groups controlled which areas, how easy it was to travel between
different areas, the security and human rights situation, and the conditions in
the IDP camps.
81. Sources indicated that control of Mogadishu was divided between
the Transitional Federal Government, backed by AMISOM troops, and
al-Shabaab. Although the sources had different views on which groups
controlled which districts, they mostly agreed that the Transitional Federal
Government controlled the airport, the seaport, Villa Somalia and the road
between the airport and Villa Somalia.
82. Sources indicated that the security situation in Mogadishu was poor,
with thousands of civilians killed in the fighting between AMISOM and
al-Shabaab. Areas controlled by al-Shabaab were at risk of shelling by
20 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
AMISOM, while areas controlled by AMISOM were at risk of shelling by
al-Shabaab. All parties to the conflict were guilty of indiscriminate shelling.
Violence was sporadic and rape was an issue in many areas. Consequently,
there was a constant movement of IDPs into and out of the city. However,
one diplomatic source suggested that it would be possible to live in
non-conflict areas of the city, which were generally considered to be safe.
83. Sources also indicated that the nature of al-Shabaab violence had
become more sophisticated over the past twelve months as foreign fighters
had brought with them new tactics and techniques. They not only carried
out targeted attacks against AMISOM troops and Transitional Federal
Government ministers and MPs, but they also carried out random killings of
civilians in Mogadishu in order to create disorder and chaos.
84. The report noted that there were regular flights into Somalia, most of
which were destined for Mogadishu International Airport. The EU Special
Representative informed the Mission that 15-18 flights arrived in
Mogadishu each day. An airplane captain working for African Express
Airways also told the Mission that his airline had carried 12,000 passengers
into Mogadishu in the first eight months of 2010.
85. The road between the airport and Mogadishu was controlled by the
Transitional Federal Government with AMISOM support and these groups
managed all checkpoints along the route. It would not be particularly
dangerous for ordinary Somalis unless they found themselves “in the wrong
place at the wrong time”. However, there were reports of a failed attack on
the airport on 9 September 2010 and some sources suggested that contacts
were required in order to make the journey from the airport. The EU Special
Representative for the EU Delegation on Somalia indicated that those
members of the diaspora who regularly travelled to Mogadishu were
well-connected and that mobility was limited unless the individual was
aligned with a militia. Likewise, a representative from an international NGO
indicated that “any Somalis returning to Mogadishu International Airport
would need a lot of preparation and would need to ensure they had contacts
in Mogadishu”.
86. A representative from one international NGO suggested that al-
Shabaab knew who was landing at the airport as they were receiving
information from Transitional Federal Government soldiers based there.
87. Most of the sources interviewed agreed that Somalis were able to
move around within Mogadishu without much restriction. Two sources
described the checkpoints in the city as “random” or “variable” as they
tended to change according to fighting areas and the level of control of
specific groups. One source suggested that checkpoints operated by the
Transitional Federal Government or Hizbul Islam were more difficult to
negotiate as they were operated with less discipline and normally demanded
money. Al-Shabaab checkpoints normally checked that people were
obeying their code of behaviour and would therefore stop women travelling
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 21
alone. Some individuals operating these checkpoints would punish those
who were not acting according to al-Shabaab’s rules.
88. Contrary to the majority opinion, the EU Special Representative
informed the fact-finding mission that all civilians in Mogadishu would
either be aligned to a militia or completely unable to get out of the town.
The Special Representative even suggested that some Somalis were unable
to leave their own district.
89. There was no consensus on which groups controlled the other regions
in southern and central Somalia, although all agreed that al-Shabaab
controlled most of the land south of a line drawn between Beletweyne and
Dhusarmareb. Militias broadly aligned with the Transitional Federal
Government controlled pockets of land on the Ethiopian border. Hizbul
Islam was nominally in control of some small areas, including parts of the
Afgooye Corridor, but al-Shabaab’s influence in these areas was significant.
Finally, the region of Galmudug was controlled by a local clan-based
administration which acted under the umbrella of Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca.
90. Outside Mogadishu, people were generally permitted to travel within
the areas controlled by al-Shabaab although they could encounter
difficulties at checkpoints if they were not obeying al-Shabaab rules.
Although al-Shabaab had endeavoured to remove “illegal” checkpoints, a
number of sources indicated that some clan militia checkpoints remained.
The evidence appeared to suggest that it was possible to negotiate the
various checkpoints, although a certain amount of risk was involved.
91. A diplomatic source stated that young men travelling in al-Shabaab
held areas could be targeted by al-Shabaab for recruitment. This was
supported by an international NGO, which advised that forced recruitment
was becoming systematic. Young men were asked to register with
al-Shabaab, including those who were stopped at checkpoints.
92. A number of sources considered the areas controlled by al-Shabaab
to be stable and generally safe for those Somalis who were able to “play the
game” and avoid the unnecessary attention of al-Shabaab. One the other
hand, one international NGO believed that there were “no safe areas in
southern-central Somalia as long as al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam were
present”. Another NGO indicated that everywhere in southern and central
Somalia had been affected by violations of international humanitarian law
and by a situation of generalised violence and displacement over the past
three years on account of the expansion of the insurgency outside
Mogadishu. Finally, a diplomatic source stated that “everywhere is volatile
and can change at any time”.
93. With regard to the human rights situation, forced recruitment of
adults and children appeared to be an emerging problem, particularly for
those displaced in the Afgooye Corridor. Sources suggested that all parties
to the conflict recruited children, although it was not certain that the
Transitional Federal Government forcibly recruited them. Child recruitment
22 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
was, however, very common in al-Shabaab areas, as they would forcibly
recruit the eldest son from local families, some of whom were as young as
ten years old. Adult males were also forced to register with al-Shabaab in
Merca and Doble.
94. Moreover, the sources indicated that in al-Shabaab areas, human
rights were practically non-existent because of the organisation’s
interpretation of Sharia law, which was not in accordance with the beliefs of
ordinary Somalis. Consequently, people lived in fear as there were serious
punishments if al-Shabaab orders were not obeyed. Women in particular
were routinely targeted and were not permitted to engage in trade. In
addition, al-Shabaab had made a concerted effort to drive NGOs out of its
areas by a number of means, including demanding payment of a
“registration fee” of up to USD 15,000, looting warehouses and threatening
workers. In some cases al-Shabaab had stolen aid and confiscated the assets
of NGOs to sell for profit. There was therefore no international NGO
presence in al-Shabaab controlled areas and health and feeding programmes
had been stopped, with significant consequences for the civilian population.
95. Finally, sources were asked about the conditions in IDP camps. They
indicated that although those with resources had left Mogadishu, there were
some 250,000 people displaced within the city and no humanitarian
assistance was available to them. Estimates suggested that there were a
further 200,000 to 500,000 people in the Afgooye Corridor, which had
become increasingly urbanised. It was difficult to give an exact number of
the people based in the corridor because, due to the nature of the fighting, a
lot of people were going back and forward to Mogadishu. Moreover, access
for NGOs was difficult as the corridor was controlled by “gatekeepers” who
controlled who and what moved into and out of the area. These
“gatekeepers” tended to be opportunists who were not aligned to any
particular group but they were able to make assistance from NGOs very
difficult. Two NGOs said that it was incredibly difficult to access the
corridor and, where access was possible, aid was often diverted. Moreover,
landlords in the area were either selling the land that the IDPs lived on or
were charging rent that they could not afford, forcing them to move on.
96. One international NGO believed that there was a hierarchy within
the camps, but did not know whether it was based on clan membership or
length of residence. Consequently, it could not be guaranteed that majority
clan members would not face problems within the IDP camps.
97. The sources were not aware of any other significant IDP settlements
within Somalia.
2. United Kingdom Border and Immigration Agency Operational
Guidance Note
98. Operational Guidance Notes (“OGNs”) are produced by the Border
and Immigration Agency of the Home Office. They evaluate the general,
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 23
political and human rights situation in a country and provide guidance on
the nature and handling of the most common type of claim.
99. The OGN on Somalia of 1 July 2010 described how fighting by
Transitional Federal Government troops, allied militias, and AMISOM
forces against anti-government forces in southern and central Somalia had
resulted in widespread human rights abuses, including the killing of
thousands of civilians, the displacement of more than one million people
and widespread property damage, particularly in Mogadishu. However, a
fall in clashes between government troops and insurgents had led to a
substantial drop in the numbers of civilians killed in fighting in Mogadishu
in 2009. The Mogadishu-based Elman Peace and Human Rights
Organisation stated that 1,739 civilians were killed in fighting in 2009,
down from 7,574 in 2008 and 8,636 in 2007. At least 4,911 civilians were
wounded and 3,900 families displaced by clashes in 2009.
100. The report noted that while Mogadishu remained the focus of the
insurgency, fighting had occurred in other parts of the country, including
Beletweyne, Kismayo, the Gedo and Bakool regions, from Jowhar to
Harardhere and around the central towns of Dhusamareb and Beletweyne.
101. The report indicated that restrictions on movement within Somalia
had reduced significantly compared to when the AIT considered the
situation in AM and AM (Somalia). In particular, checkpoints operated by
the Transitional Federal Government had decreased and there were no
reports of armed clan factions operating checkpoints in 2009. Al-Shabaab
had established checkpoints at the exit/entry routes of the towns under its
control for security reasons. It checked goods, searched people and ensured
that its strict Islamic codes were enforced, but it did not collect money.
There were also reports that Al-Shabaab had eradicated extortion, robbery
and murder from bandits in areas it controlled.
102. With the exception of Mogadishu, there were no reports of
checkpoints between towns or within towns, as was common in previous
years. There were, however, several checkpoints on the route from
Mogadishu towards the Central Regions and some precautions could be
necessary, particularly during militia fighting. There was no evidence that
those not of adverse interest to the Transitional Federal Government,
al-Shabaab or groups such as Hizbul Islam or Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca,
would be unable to pass through checkpoints safely. During overland trips
clan protection was not required unless ongoing animosities between two
rival clans were involved. Individuals would not generally need an escort,
but if they considered an escort to be necessary, it would be feasible for
them to arrange one either before or after arrival. It would therefore be
feasible for many to return to their home areas from Mogadishu
International Airport as most areas were more accessible than previously.
103. The report also noted that it was possible for Somalis to fly from
Mogadishu International Airport directly to Hargeisa, in Somaliland, a
24 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
region which was widely considered to be relatively safe. However, the
authorities in Somaliland, like the authorities in Puntland, would only admit
those who originated from the territory or those who had close affiliation to
the territory through clan membership. In Somaliland, the majority clan was
the Isaaq.
104. With regard to the human rights situation, the report noted that:
“Al-Shabaab currently controls much of southern and central Somalia, including
large portions of Mogadishu. The Transitional Federal Government has maintained
control of a few areas in the south east of the city, government installations, the
Presidential palace and strategic locations such as the airport and seaport. Al-Shabaab
controls large portions of Mogadishu including the north and north-east parts of the
city, the main stadium and the main market. It controls nearly all of Middle and Lower
Jubba regions, Gedo region, Bay region, Bakool region, and parts of Lower Shabelle
region. This includes control of the key port cities of Kismayo and Marka and the
Kenya border town of Diif. It also wields significant influence in Middle Shabelle and
Hiraan region.
The human rights situation has deteriorated particularly in areas controlled by
al-Shabaab and allied extremist groups. Al-Shabaab and other armed groups have
continued to violate women’s rights in southern and central Somalia. Women face
arbitrary detention, restriction of movement and other forms of abuse for failure to
obey orders, including non-observance of dress codes. There is a rising pattern of
inhuman and degrading treatment, including stoning, amputations, floggings and
corporal punishment. Men too are subjected to inhuman and cruel treatment for their
illicit relationship with women and other offences such as ‘spying’. Journalists have
been repeatedly subjected to threats and short-term arbitrary detentions, particularly in
Baidoa and Kismayo. Al-Shabaab has increasingly targeted civil society groups, peace
activists, media and human rights organisations. Humanitarian assistance has been
severely hampered by the prevailing insecurity and threats specifically targeting
humanitarian agencies. In southern and central Somalia there is evidence that children
are being exposed to recruitment into armed forces by all parties to the conflict.”
105. In respect of the humanitarian situation, the report indicated that by
November 2009 the total number of displaced persons had reached
1.55 million, 93% of whom were concentrated in southern and central areas,
including 524,000 in the Afgooye corridor. The security situation was
having a negative impact on the relief operation. Rising threats and attacks
on humanitarian operations, as well as the imposition of demands from
armed groups, had made it virtually impossible for the World Food
Programme (“WFP”) to continue reaching people in need in southern
Somalia. Inflammatory statements by al-Shabaab against relief
organisations, threats against humanitarian staff, explicit rejection of foreign
food aid and demands for fees had all worsened.
106. The report concluded that while the general humanitarian situation
in southern and central Somalia was poor, it was not so serious as to cause,
in itself, a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Aid agencies were
subjected to obstructions and dangers in delivering aid to IDPs but most of
those in need continued to be reached and efforts were being strengthened to
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 25
sustain critical food operations in southern and central Somalia. Each case
therefore had to be considered on its individual merits in order to assess
whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, the Article 3 threshold
was met.
B. United States’ Government Reports
1. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices,
Somalia, 2009 (11 March 2010)
107. The report indicated that the Transitional Federal Government’s
respect for human rights had improved. However, the poor human rights
situation in Somalia had deteriorated further during the year, especially in
the areas controlled by al-Shabaab and allied extremist groups. Human
rights abuses included unlawful and politically motivated killings,
kidnappings, torture, rape, amputations, beatings, official impunity, harsh
and life-threatening prison conditions, and arbitrary arrest and detention.
108. With regard to movement within Somalia, the report indicated that
checkpoints operated by the Transitional Federal Government and its
associated militias had decreased. According to a report by UNOCHA, al-
Shabaab established checkpoints at the exit/entry routes of the towns under
its control for security reasons. There were no reports of checkpoints
between towns or within towns, as was common in previous years. There
were also no reports of armed clan factions operating checkpoints during the
year.
2. “Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace”,
Congressional Research Service, 16 December 2010
109. The report noted that the humanitarian situation in Somalia
remained dire as the fighting in Mogadishu had added more challenges to
already poor conditions on the ground. An estimated 1.1 million people had
been displaced and more than 475,000 had fled to neighbouring countries in
the past two years. Targeted attacks on humanitarian groups had made
delivery of assistance difficult and the Obama Administration had
suspended assistance in areas controlled by al-Shabaab.
C. The Norwegian Directorate of Immigration Country of Origin
Centre Somalia: Security and Conflict in the South
(23 August 2010)
110. The report noted that the situation in southern Somalia and in
Mogadishu in particular was unstable and the power balance in the regions,
districts and urban areas could change almost from day to day.
26 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
Consequently, information on area control could become out of date very
quickly.
111. It was clear, however, that the military and political situation
remained extremely complicated. Large areas of southern Somalia were
controlled by al-Shabaab and other Islamist groups in opposition to the
authorities. Many areas of Mogadishu had been the scene of shooting,
shelling and fighting between Islamists and Government forces supported
by AMISOM. In spite of a certain amount of stability in parts of the
country, the civilian population was still the victim of indiscriminate
violence, albeit to a slightly lesser extent than previously. Leading observers
agreed that the situation was fragile as the Islamist groups had the will and
means to continue to fight, while the Transitional Federal Government was
weak and probably would not survive without the presence of AMISOM.
112. The UN Special Envoy for Human Rights, together with a number
of other international observers, noted that the arrival of foreign jihadists in
Somalia had resulted in al-Shabaab operations becoming “professionalised”,
which meant that they were implemented with greater precision and
brutality. According to a number of observers, individual al-Shabaab cells
were controlled by foreign jihadists who did not wish for peace or to enter
into any form of dialogue with the authorities.
113. With regard to the humanitarian situation, the report noted that
while the nutritional situation was expected to improve in the year ahead on
account of a good harvest, the food security situation remained poor. Food
prices were high and access to clean drinking water remained a considerable
problem.
114. Estimates indicated that the total number of displaced persons in
Somalia was around 1.3 million. Resources in local areas were stretched to
the maximum as the displaced from Mogadishu sought refuge in traditional
clan areas. While clan members were prepared to share what resources they
had as far as possible, displaced persons without clan connections did not
have that safety net and were therefore in a more difficult position.
However, the report quoted the UN Special Envoy as stating:
“Monitoring the human rights situation in south and central Somalia remains very
difficult due to the serious constraints on gathering information owing to security
conditions. The independent expert was himself unable to visit the region.
Nevertheless, major human rights concerns have been documented and the
independent expert remains deeply concerned at the deterioration of the situation.”
115. The report noted that freedom of movement in Somalia had
improved since January 2009 and the general impression was that the
population could travel relatively freely in both government controlled areas
and areas controlled by other groups. The removal of road blocks had had a
positive effect on criminality as cases of “rape and run” had previously been
widespread in these areas. However, in spite of the improvements,
restrictions imposed by al-Shabaab on women restricted their freedom of
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 27
movement and had a negative impact on their families, which were often
dependant on women’s income from trading.
116. International organisations had increasingly been the target of
violent attacks since 2008 and, because of the safety risk, only a few
international representatives remained in southern Somalia. Like the UN
and foreign embassies, business was run from main offices in Nairobi while
local employees were responsible for work on the ground in Somalia. Local
human rights organisations could not publish detailed reports for fear of
their own safety. However, aid work in Somalia could be risky for local
employees as they were increasingly coming under attack.
117. In any case, aid organisations had limited access in the areas
controlled by al-Shabaab. In January 2010 the WFP decided to suspend its
activities in the al-Shabaab controlled areas. This has had consequences for
the population in Lower Shabelle Bay, Bakool and Gedo as access to the
necessary food supplies and other aid was limited. Moreover, at the
beginning of August 2010, al-Shabaab ordered the Adventist Development
and Relief Agency, World Vision and Diakonia out of the areas under their
control on the ground that they were operating missionary activities. With
these three organisations gone, very few international aid organisations
remained in place in southern Somalia.
118. With regard to the situation in Mogadishu, the report noted that
conditions in the different areas varied and there was a difference between
the northern and southern parts of the capital. The areas of Hodan, Hawl,
Wadaag, Wardhingley, Yaqshiid, Bondheere, Shibis and Abdulaziz were the
hardest hit by shelling and attacks. To a lesser extent, the districts of
Medina, Dharkley, Hamar Weyne, Waaberi and Hamar Jajab were also
affected by the fighting. However, the report noted that the situation was
unpredictable and could easily change. For example, the Karaan district in
the north had previously been considered relatively peaceful but was now
shot to pieces and all its inhabitants had fled.
119. According to a well-informed international aid worker, ten people
per week died in Mogadishu due to fighting. It was difficult to estimate how
many of the dead were civilians. It was also difficult accurately to estimate
the number of displaced. According to the UNCHR, there were around
370,000 displaced persons in Mogadishu and 360,000 in the Afgooye
Corridor. However, it was possible that there were great margins of error as
the UN estimates were based on satellite images and it was thought that
many houses had been built to mislead aid organisations. Nevertheless,
well-informed sources indicated that the situation in Somalia today was
much more difficult than it had been at the beginning of the 1990s as
international organisations were no longer able to carry out their tasks.
Poverty was more widespread in Mogadishu than it had been previously and
it was therefore more difficult to help those in need. In addition, the clan
system had been weakened.
28 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
120. Outside Mogadishu the fighting was mostly localised around
certain key areas and towns. Strategic towns such as Kismayo, Beletweyne
and various towns in the Galgaduud had changed hands many times in
recent years and there were also tensions in Bakool and Gedo. However, the
main challenge for most of the population of southern Somalia was
humanitarian. Fifteen percent of all children under five in southern Somalia
were malnourished and medical treatment was limited, especially in
villages, where it was estimated that there was one doctor per
25,000 inhabitants.
D. United Nations Reports
1. The UN Secretary-General’s Reports
121. In his report to the Security Council on 11 May 2010, the Secretary
General noted that there had been increased fighting in southern and central
Somalia during the first three months of 2010. Over 110,000 people had
been displaced during this period. In addition to the fighting in Mogadishu,
there was also continued fighting between al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam in
Lower Juba and Lower Shabelle, and between al-Shabaab and Ahlu Sunna
Waljamaca in the central region. National United Nations staff faced direct
threats from armed groups in these areas and the presence of international
staff in these regions was restricted.
122. The security situation continued to have a direct impact on the
provision of humanitarian aid. The report noted that on 28 February 2008
al-Shabaab called for the termination of all World Food Programme
(“WFP”) operations inside Somalia, and on 1 March 2010 and 7 April 2010
WFP compounds in Buale and Wajid were occupied by al-Shabaab. There
had been no food distribution to over 300,000 IDPs in the Afgooye corridor
since November 2009 owing to inaccessibility and another 1.1 million
intended beneficiaries were not receiving food distributions throughout the
south and central regions.
123. In his report to the Security Council on 9 September 2010, the
Secretary General noted that volatility and insecurity had once again
increased in Mogadishu. AMISOM and the Transitional Federal
Government frequently engaged the insurgents in response to mortar fire
and direct attacks and military operations to secure positions in key districts
of Mogadishu led to fierce battles. Moreover, the frequency of attacks with
improvised explosive devices had led to an increase in civilian casualties
during the reporting period. According to the World Health Organisation,
approximately 1,600 civilian casualties were admitted to the two main
hospitals in Mogadishu from 20 March 2010 to 11 July 2010. That figure,
which included almost 400 children under the age of 5 and 48 registered
deaths, had left Mogadishu’s already weak health services struggling to
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 29
cope with the casualties. He also reported that beyond Mogadishu, sporadic
clashes between al-Shabaab and Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca continued in the
central regions and the continuing insecurity had hampered UN operations
in Somalia by limiting freedom of movement for UN staff and contractors.
In July 2010 al-Shabaab seized the compound of the World Food
Programme and the houses of six national staff.
124. The ongoing conflict, particularly in Mogadishu, had displaced
179,000 people in the first quarter and 75,000 people in the second quarter
of 2010.
125. In the Secretary-General’s report of 9 November 2010 on children
and armed conflict in Somalia, he noted that civilians, including children,
continued to be the majority of casualties in Somalia, primarily as a result of
being caught in the crossfire between the parties to the conflict, shelling and
explosions. During 2009 3.64 million people, including approximately
1.8 million children, relied on humanitarian assistance. However, food
supplies remained disrupted, access to clean water and medical assistance
hindered, and hospitals were stretched to capacity. As from January 2010,
food distribution by the World Food Programme was disrupted in all areas
controlled by al-Shabaab.
126. Moreover, the climate of violence and impunity exacerbated grave
violations of children’s rights as individuals were taking advantage of the
lack of rule of law and the availability of arms to commit violent crimes
against children and other vulnerable members of the population. This was
borne out by evidence of rising levels of acts of sexual violence against
children. Most at risk were women and girls living on the streets or in open
and unprotected settlements for IDPs. In addition, available information
indicated that al-Shabaab had undertaken systematic and widespread
recruitment of children for use in the conflict. Indeed, it was alleged that at
the Galduuma base between Bay and Lower Shabelle, al-Shabaab had 1,800
children, some as young as 9 years old.
127. In his most recent report to the Security Council, dated
28 April 2011, the Secretary General stated that a major military offensive
against Al-Shabaab had begun on 19 February 2011. The offensive by the
Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a and other groups allied with the Transitional
Federal Government against Al-Shabaab in southern central Somalia had
focused on the Ethiopia-Kenya-Somalia border. Hostilities centred on the
Gedo, Bay and Bakool regions, with armed conflict most prevalent in Bula
Hawa and, to a lesser extent, in the vicinity of Beletweyne and Dolo. Troops
allied with the Transitional Federal Government had taken control of the
town of Dhobley, close to the Kenyan border, on 3 April 2011. Reports of
heavy casualties and intensified recruitment efforts on the part of
Al-Shabaab suggested that the group’s capabilities might have been
reduced. However, Al-Shabaab continued to receive arms and ammunition
30 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
through southern Somali ports and acquire financial resources from
extortion, illegal exports and taxation.
2. Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in
Somalia, Shamsul Bari (16 September 2010)
128. At the date the report was drafted, heavy fighting had again broken
out in Mogadishu and International Committee of the Red Cross reported
that hospitals were swamped with war-wounded. According to a report by
the Elman Peace Center of Somalia, in the first seven months of 2010
918 civilians died and 2,555 were injured as a result of the increased
fighting and shelling. While most casualties appeared to have been the result
either of attacks by al-Shabaab and its allies against Transitional Federal
Government and AMISOM forces or retaliatory attacks by AMISOM, direct
fighting between Islamists such as Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca and al-Shabaab
combined with inter-clan clashes in central Somalia also contributed to the
high number of deaths. In addition, reports indicated that parties to the
conflict had failed to adhere to the principles of international humanitarian
law relating to the protection of civilians as hostilities had been waged in
urban areas and precautionary measures to avoid civilian casualties had
been disregarded.
129. With regard to the human rights situation in areas under
al-Shabaab’s control, United Nations Workers recorded reports of nine
executions by firing squad or stoning, mostly for alleged spying or murder,
five cases of amputation, mostly of suspected thieves, and the flogging or
whipping of some twenty-eight individuals. In addition, seven cases of
beheading were reported, including those of five workers allegedly killed in
April 2010 because they were involved in reconstruction work at the
Parliament, and two people were allegedly shot dead in June 2010 when
they fled from a house in Mogadishu raided by Hizbul Islam because they
were watching a World Cup match.
130. Displacement also continued to be a problem. According to a
UNHCR report, during the first seven months of 2010 50,065 Somalis
sought refuge in neighbouring countries and over 200,000 were internally
displaced. As of the end of July 2010, there were 600,484 Somali refugees,
mainly hosted in Kenya, Yemen, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Tanzania and
Uganda. In addition, 1.4 million Somalis were internally displaced.
Assessments conducted revealed that there was a high prevalence of sexual
violence in IDP camps, victims were generally of minority clan origin,
bereft of clan protection and often forced to engage in risky coping
mechanisms.
131. Recruitment of children to be put on the front line remained an
issue of major concern. Although recent media attention highlighted the
presence of children within the ranks of forces linked to the Government,
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 31
the majority of reports of new instances of child recruitment attributed
responsibility to anti-Government elements.
132. The report further noted that a public health crisis persisted in
southern and central Somalia. While good rains between April and
June 2010 had improved the food security situation, two million people
(27 percent of the total population of Somalia) continued to face a
humanitarian crisis. Moreover, the number of acutely malnourished children
was estimated to be 230,000, of which 35,000 were severely malnourished,
and the majority of these were in southern and central Somalia. The forced
movement of people on account of the conflict also limited access to clean
water and basic health services.
3. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR):
Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection
Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Somalia (“the Eligibility
Guidelines”), 5 May 2010
133. UNHCR’s Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International
Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Somalia (“the Eligibility
Guidelines”) were published on 5 May 2010. The Eligibility Guidelines
noted that over the last three years there had been a consistent failure by all
parties to respect basic principles of international humanitarian law,
resulting in civilians regularly being caught in the cross-fire. Indiscriminate
bombardment and military offensives were carried out in civilian areas with
little or no regard for the rules of war and road-side and vehicle-borne
bombs, grenade attacks in civilian areas, and deliberate attacks on civilian
targets were all too frequent. Hospital records indicated that there were over
900 civilian casualties in Mogadishu in March and April 2010. Other
estimates suggested that between 20 and 50 civilians were killed in
Mogadishu each week.
134. While the armed conflict was a major cause of displacement, the
report noted that increasing numbers of Somalis were fleeing due to fear of
persecution linked to the recent political and human rights situation. Others
feared persecution due to perceived or actual contravention of traditional
Somali social norms and practices. These groups included members of
minority clans, women of specific profiles, victims of blood feuds, Christian
converts, and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender individuals.
135. Consequently, UNHCR concluded that the widespread disregard of
their obligations under international law by all of the parties to the conflict
and the reported scale of human rights violations made it clear that any
person returned to southern and central Somalia would, solely on account of
his or her presence there, face a real risk of serious harm. Moreover,
UNHCR considered that there was no internal flight alternative available
inside southern and central Somalia.
32 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
136. UNHCR identified three potential agents of persecution. First, there
were Islamic militant groups such as al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. Both
groups had been accused of, and both had admitted to, using the civilian
population as human shields during military operations. Both groups also
had conducted a systematic campaign of intimidation and assassination of
civilians working for, associated with, or perceived to be collaborating with
the Transitional Federal Government, AMISOM or the Ethiopian forces.
They had also recruited young people and children into their ranks, often
with threats of force and violence. Finally, they had set up Islamist
administrations in areas under their control and issued decrees to restrict
social behaviour. The enforcement of these decrees was often extreme and
abusive and violations were punished severely by Sharia courts.
137. Secondly, UNHCR indicated that business persons and civil society
figures were particularly at risk as a result of the increased criminality in
Mogadishu.
138. Finally, UNHCR identified the Transitional Federal Government
and AMISOM as potential agents of persecution. It noted that both groups
were accused of indiscriminately shelling civilian areas of Mogadishu in
reprisal to mortar attacks launched by opposition forces. In addition, both
groups had also been accused of firing at civilians.
139. The report further noted that effective State protection was
unavailable in southern and central Somalia given the situation of armed
conflict and the inability of the government authorities to extend control
over any territory outside a few districts in Mogadishu. Moreover, since
2007 clan protection had been undermined in Mogadishu and increasingly
in other regions of southern and central Somalia by the ongoing conflict and
by the diminution of the traditional clan systems of justice due to the
favoured strict interpretations of Sharia law being implemented by
al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam in areas under their control.
E. Non-Governmental Organisations’ Reports
1. Amnesty International: No End in Sight – The Ongoing Suffering of
Somalia’s Civilians (25 March 2010)
140. Amnesty International noted that civilians in Mogadishu and other
cities such as Dhusamareb in central Somalia and Beletweyne in the Hiran
region continued to be killed and seriously injured due to the fighting
between the armed opposition groups and pro-TGF forces. It noted that:
“no party to the conflict appears to take the necessary precautions to avoid loss of
civilian life and injury, despite their obligations to do so under international
humanitarian law. Civilians are often caught up in shelling and cross-fire by all parties
to the conflict, resulting in death and injury to thousands. The fighting has provoked
massive displacement within and outside cities in south and central Somalia and
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 33
disruption of access to humanitarian aid, which are already curtailed by insecurity and
the targeting of aid workers. Civilians living in areas controlled by armed opposition
groups are also increasingly subject to abduction, torture and unlawful killings.”
141. With regard to the security situation in Mogadishu, they noted that:
“There are near weekly incidents of fighting and shelling between armed opposition
groups on one side and Transitional Federal Government forces and AMISOM troops
on the other side, and near weekly reports of civilian deaths and injuries as a result.
Armed opposition groups continue to launch attacks from areas inhabited or
frequented by civilians in Mogadishu, endangering the lives of civilians. They fire
mortars and heavy artillery in the direction of Transitional Federal Government and
AMISOM bases, near which civilians live. Transitional Federal Government and
AMISOM forces are repeatedly accused of responding by firing mortars and using
other artillery weapons in the direction of the attackers. All sides to the conflict use
mortars and other heavy artillery, weapons which are inherently indiscriminate when
used in densely populated urban areas. Some sources have even alleged to Amnesty
International that AMISOM is firing BM or “Katyusha” rockets when responding to
attacks by armed opposition groups. These attacks and counter-attacks invariably
result in civilian deaths and injuries.”
142. The report indicated that the delivery of emergency humanitarian
aid to Somalia was shrinking, as aid workers were coming under attack and
armed groups were imposing restrictions on the movement of international
agencies working in areas under their control. In particular, it noted that:
“On 11 October 2009, Hizbul Islam in the Banadir region asked all humanitarian
organisations operating in areas under their control to register within 15 days and pay
a registration fee by 25 October, whilst al-Shabab in the Juba region renewed their
ban against any agency wishing to operate in the region, stating “We want our people
to work for their life rather than depending on food aid.”
In November, al-Shabaab in Bay and Bakool regions issued a list of 11 conditions
which humanitarian organisations were required to adhere to in order to continue their
work in the regions. These conditions reportedly included replacing all female staff
members with men within three months, an agreement not to encourage secularism or
democracy in their work and a payment of $20,000 US dollars every six months to the
al-Shabaab administration. This was followed on 25 November by an al-Shabaab
statement ordering the World Food Programme (WFP) to immediately cease the
import of relief food to the country, accusing the organisation of acting as a barrier to
self-sufficiency. All local businesspeople were ordered to terminate their contracts
with the WFP and the organisation was ordered to empty their warehouses and
food-stocks by 1 January 2010.”
143. On 4 January 2010 the World Food Programme suspended its work
in southern Somalia due to insecurity for its staff and the demands placed on
them by parties to the conflict. Ninty-five percent of the areas from which
the organisation had withdrawn were under the control of al-Shabaab, and
al-Shabaab subsequently indicated that it would never permit the
organisation to return. However, Amnesty International noted that over half
of Somalia’s population was dependent on food aid and many of those
people lived in the areas that the WFP had withdrawn from.
34 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
144. The report also noted that the WFP had experienced difficulties in
delivering food to the IDP settlements in Afgooye, where some 360,000
persons displaced by the conflict were thought to live. On 28 February 2010
armed men stopped trucks transporting food aid from Mogadishu to
Afgooye and the WFP have since stated that the last time they organised a
general food distribution in Afgooye was in November 2009.
2. Amnesty International Briefing Paper, 18 October 2010
145. The report indicated that civilians in Mogadishu continued to bear
the brunt of the fighting and were often caught up in shelling and cross-fire
by all parties to the conflict. There were nearly weekly incidents of fighting
and shelling between armed opposition groups on one side and Transitional
Federal Government forces and AMISOM troops on the other, and near
weekly civilian deaths and injuries as a result.
146. Medical records of the Daynile hospital on the outskirts of
Mogadishu showed that for the first seven months of 2010 48 percent of its
patients were suffering war-related injuries and 38 percent of those patients
were women and children. Between June and July 2010, hundreds of
civilians were killed or injured in Mogadishu. Some field reports claimed
that there were as many as fifty deaths in one day, while UNHCR estimated
that during the last week of August and the first week of September 2010,
230 civilians were killed and 400 were injured in fighting.
147. Likewise, Médecins sans Frontières stated that between
23 August and 24 September 2010 its medical team in Daynile hospital
treated 542 war-wounded people and performed over 200 surgeries.
Following intense fighting on 23 September 2010 MSF treated 161 war-
wounded patients in one day.
148. The African Union recently signalled its intention to increase the
number of AMISOM troops to 8,000 and Amnesty International believed
that when this happened it was likely to result in more attacks against the
force by armed Islamist groups and more retaliatory shelling by AMISOM.
149. The report noted that the fighting had also caused the destruction of
homes, the separation of families during chaotic flight, and massive
displacement. UNHCR estimated that 42,400 people had been displaced
from within and around Mogadishu since 23 August 2010, some 25,400
having fled Mogadishu and about 17,100 others having moved to different
parts of the city.
150. Al-Shabaab had also been seizing cities elsewhere in southern and
central Somalia. In particular, there had been clashes in and around
Kismayo, Dhusamareb, Beletweyne and Dobley. As a result, 29,000
civilians had been displaced from Dhusamareb and 25,000 had been
displaced from Beletweyne. In addition to the fighting, al-Shabaab had also
severely restricted humanitarian access in most of southern and central
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 35
Somalia, putting civilians at risk. According to the report, humanitarian
access in southern Somalia was at its lowest since the end of 2006.
151. In addition to indiscriminate attacks and the situation of generalised
violence, certain categories of people were particularly at risk of targeted
killing. These categories included people linked with the Transitional
Federal Government, civil society activists, aid workers and journalists.
Children and young men were also at high risk of being forcibly recruited to
fight for the armed Islamist groups.
3. Amnesty International – From Life Without Peace to Peace Without
Life
152. This report, which was published on 8 December 2010, focussed on
the treatment of Somali refugees and asylum-seekers in Kenya, which
hosted the largest number of Somali refugees in the region. As of September
2010, there were 338,151 registered refugees in the region, but it was
estimated that the actual number was much higher.
153. In 2007 the Kenyan authorities closed the country’s border with
Somalia and, according to estimates of Kenyan NGOs, thousands of Somali
refugees were subsequently returned to Somalia by the Kenyan security
forces. Some were expelled at the border while others were denied entry
altogether. Many of these refugees were women and children who,
according to UNHCRs eligibility guidelines, should have been granted
international protection.
154. Amnesty International also received numerous reports of the
Kenyan police at the closed border threatening asylum-seekers with forced
removal to Somalia in order to extort bribes or arresting or detaining
asylum-seekers until they paid a bribe. In addition, Somali asylum-seekers
were often arbitrarily arrested, detained and charged with “illegal entry”.
155. Prior to the closure of the border, new refugees were registered and
medically screened at an UNHCR-administered transit centre 15km from
the border before being transported to refugee camps. When the border
closed, this transit centre also closed with the consequence that refugees
who made it to Kenya had to travel a further 80km to the refugee camps
before they could be registered. This journey was often a dangerous one,
during which Kenyan police were able to commit abuses against them with
impunity.
156. Approximately 280,000 registered Somali refugees were confined
to three refugee camps in Dadaab in north eastern Kenya, which were
originally intended to accommodate 90,000 refugees. As a result of the
severe overcrowding, access to shelter, water, sanitation and other essential
services was impeded. As no plots of land were available, new refugees
could not build shelters and instead had to stay with relatives or clan
members. In addition, the water infrastructure was only designed for one
third of the number of people currently living in the camps and, as a result,
36 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
many refugees complained that the allocation of water was insufficient.
Those living at the edges of the camps often had to walk long distances to
collect water.
157. Refugees also complained of insecurity in the camps, which they
attributed either to tensions between different clans or to the alleged
presence of members of or sympathisers with al-Shabaab. Incidences of
theft and sexual abuse were on the increase. Aid and protection agencies
told Amnesty International that there were not enough police officers
present in the camps adequately to address security incidents. In any case,
refugees often distrusted the Kenyan police as many had been the victim of
abuses by the security forces while on their way to the camps.
158. In October 2009 reports emerged that the Kenyan security forces
were recruiting Somali refugees for military training in order to fight for the
Transitional Federal Government in Somalia. UNHCR subsequently
launched an awareness campaign in the camps, warning refugees that they
would lose their refugee status if they joined armed groups.
159. Somali refugees in the Dadaab camps were generally not permitted
to leave the camps, unless in exceptional circumstances, and they had
almost no livelihood opportunities. They did, however, receive free
humanitarian assistance in the camps.
4. Human Rights Watch: Harsh War, Harsh Peace
160. In this report, published in April 2010, Human Rights Watch
documented abuses by al-Shabaab, the Transitional Federal Government
and AMISOM in Somalia. The report indicated that over the past year,
hostilities had raged in strategically important areas, like Mogadishu, while
much of the rest of Somalia enjoyed relative peace. However, the report
concluded that both the inhabitants of the shattered capital and those living
in more peaceful areas had endured devastating patterns of abuse.
161. In Mogadishu and in other conflict areas in southern and central
Somalia the fighting had exacted a heavy toll on civilians. In particular, the
report noted that all parties to the conflict had conducted numerous mortar
attacks against enemy forces in densely populated areas of Mogadishu
without regard for the civilian population, causing a high loss of civilian life
and property. While mortars could be highly accurate weapons if guided to
their targets by spotters or guidance systems, none of the warring parties in
Mogadishu had employed such methods. Opposition armed groups had
indiscriminately fired mortar rounds in the general direction of Transitional
Federal Government or AMISOM installations in southern Mogadishu.
Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM forces sometimes
responded in kind, directing mortar rounds towards the general area they
had taken fire from or simply bombarding areas such as Bakara Market that
were opposition strongholds. Such attacks, while of limited military value,
caused considerable loss of civilian life and property damage.
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 37
162. The report noted that there had been sporadic fighting between
other groups outside Mogadishu which had exacted a heavy toll on
civilians. For example, clashes between Hizbul Islam and Ahlu Sunna
Waljamaca around the central towns of Dhusamareb and Beletweyne
displaced more that 25,000 people at the beginning of 2010.
163. The report further indicated that humanitarian workers had been
targeted. According to the Office of the UN Emergency Relief Co-ordinator,
47 aid workers were killed in Somalia in 2008 and 2009. Humanitarian
workers also faced a variety of other threats, from the broader trend of
indiscriminate violence in conflict areas to al-Shabaab accusations of spying
on behalf of western powers. For example, in early 2009 the WFP
suspended delivery of food aid to a vast swath of southern Somalia
controlled largely by al-Shabaab, citing the group’s escalating attacks and
harassment against its staff and “unacceptable” demands for payment.
164. Forced and unlawful recruitment was also a problem. The report
noted that opposition forces, especially but not exclusively al-Shabaab, were
expanding their ranks by threatening those who resisted with death and at
times carrying out their threats. In addition, both insurgent groups and
government forces were recruiting and using child soldiers to varying
degrees and had entered refugee camps in Kenya to enlist additional
fighters. The report noted that al-Shabaab had recruited children in a more
deliberate and systematic manner than the Transitional Federal Government
or other armed groups. Thus the recruitment of children – and the fear of it –
was widespread in many areas controlled by al-Shabaab.
165. The report stated that in areas controlled by al-Shabaab (much of
the south of Somalia), the population was subjected to targeted killings and
assaults, a repressive form of social control and brutal punishments under its
draconian interpretation of Sharia law, which went well beyond its
traditional interpretation in Somalia. While in many areas al-Shabaab’s rule
had brought relative peace and order, security came at a steep price. In
many areas, al-Shabaab dictated even minute details of daily life, from
clothing styles to prayer observance to cell phone ring tones. The report
indicated that:
“Al-Shabaab exerts enormous control over personal lives and devotes remarkable
energy to policing and penalizing conduct that it deems idle or immoral. Almost no
detail is too minute to escape the group’s scrutiny. In many areas, al-Shabaab
administrators have banned public gatherings, dancing at weddings, musical ringtones
on cell phones, western music, and movies. They have outlawed qat chewing and
cigarette smoking. They have barred men from shaving their beards and moustaches,
or wearing long hair or long trousers. They have refused to allow people on the streets
during prayer times.
In many areas, al-Shabaab patrols break up public gatherings, no matter how small,
unless they are the organizers. Frequently, al-Shabaab justifies the dispersals on the
grounds that participants are engaged in ‘idle’ or ‘useless’ activity, a concept that is
arbitrarily applied and often includes everything from playing soccer to talking among
38 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
friends. ‘If they find a group of people talking, they may just beat them and tell them
to go and do something useful’, said one man from the border village of El Wak.
One young man from Kismayo said he watched an al-Shabaab patrol throw a group
of teenage boys in jail one evening for playing Scrabble:
‘They said this was idle activity. They took them away and jailed them overnight
and shaved some of their heads with a razor blade or a broken bottle. One of them was
injured from the shaving. They won’t even let people gather to listen to the BBC, or to
smoke tobacco.’”
166. Human Rights Watch also interviewed a widower in an IDP camp
in the Afgoye corridor, who claimed that al-Shabaab gunmen had threatened
to kill him if he didn’t stop tucking in his shirt, which they criticised as a
western custom.
167. Human Rights Watch noted that while all Somalis living under
local al-Shabaab administrations had to cope with onerous and repressive
edicts, women bore the brunt of the group’s repression and abuse. In
particular, some al-Shabaab leaders had ordered women to wear a
particularly thick and bulky type of abaya, an over-gown which covered
everything except the hands, face and feet. Al-Shabaab fighters would patrol
neighbourhoods and punish women in lighter-weight abayas. In many cases
women were beaten or whipped for wearing the wrong clothing.
168. In addition, al-Shabaab administrations ordered women to close
their shops as commercial activity permitted them to “mix with men”. In a
country with a vast number of war widows and female-headed households,
this edict left many families without crucial sources of income. Moreover,
the segregation of men and women applied to all areas of daily life. Women
were not permitted to go to the market with men, even if they were relatives,
and if travelling in a vehicle, they had to sit in different seats. There were
reports of women being flogged at checkpoints if they were found to be
sitting beside a man.
169. Finally, the report noted that in many areas, al-Shabaab leaders had
embraced amputations and executions as punishment and turned them into a
public spectacle. Since 2008 at least three people had been stoned to death
for allegedly committing adultery. There were some unconfirmed reports
that one of these people was a thirteen year old girl.
5. Human Rights Watch: World Report 2010
170. Human Rights Watch Annual World Report summarised the
situation in Somalia as “one of the world’s worst human rights
catastrophes”. Mogadishu was wracked by indiscriminate warfare in which
all parties were implicated in war crimes or other serious human rights
abuses, while much of the rest of the country was under the control of local
administrations linked to armed opposition groups. In many of these areas
the population had suffered from the abusive application of Sharia law and
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 39
forced conscription of civilians, including children, as militia fighters. In
addition, a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions was unfolding,
fuelled by years of drought and insecurity that had often prevented the
effective delivery of aid. Some 3.75 million people – roughly half of
Somalia’s remaining population – were in urgent need of humanitarian
assistance. More than a million people were displaced from their homes
within Somalia and tens of thousands had fled the country as refugees in
2009.
171. The delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia had been
severely hampered by the prevailing insecurity and by threats specifically
targeting humanitarian agencies. Most of the humanitarian agencies
operating in Somalia had had to dramatically curtail their operations or had
been driven out of southern and central Somalia altogether. In
opposition-controlled areas where millions of Somalis were in need of
assistance, humanitarians had come under regular threat by al-Shabaab and
other groups which accused them of colluding with international efforts to
back the Transitional Federal Government.
6. Human Rights Watch – “Welcome to Kenya”: Police Abuse of
Somali Refugees
172. This report, which was published in June 2010, details the
continuing abuses perpetrated by the Kenyan authorities against Somali
refugees and asylum-seekers. It noted that despite the closure of the border,
more than 140,000 refugees entered Kenya and registered at the Dadaab
camps between 1 January 2007 and 30 April 2010. However, the closure of
the border and UNHCR’s transit centre had created a lawless no man’s land
in Kenya’s border area near the refugee camps. Consequently, asylum-
seekers endeavouring to reach the camps were often intercepted by Kenyan
police who sought to extort money from them and unlawfully arrest, detain,
abuse and even deport those who could not pay.
173. Human Rights Watch spoke with dozens of Somali refugees whose
vehicles had been stopped by police patrolling the border to extort money
from them in exchange for free passage to the camps. In some cases, police
had raped women and physically assaulted men. In many other cases,
refugees were arrested and detained by the police before being permitted to
register in the camps. They were detained in overcrowded cells with poor
ventilation and no, or almost no, food and water. Some were not permitted
to use the toilet and had to use the cell floor to urinate and defecate.
Detained refugees were often released upon the payment of a bribe. If they
could not pay, they were threatened with court proceedings in a last ditch
attempt to extort money from them.
174. Moreover, Human Rights Watch documented eight separate
incidents in which Kenyan police returned asylum-seekers to Somalia. All
of these incidents, which involved 152 men, women and children, took
40 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
place between September 2009 and March 2010. According to this sample,
Human Rights Watch estimated that hundreds if not thousands of Somalis
were being returned to Somalia each month in breach of the principle of
non-refoulement.
175. Such widespread abuses compelled many asylum-seekers to travel
through Kenya on smaller paths where criminals preyed on them, stealing
their belongings and raping women.
176. There were further reports of serious abuses by Kenyan police
officers within the refugee camps. Seven refugees told Human Rights
Watch of ten separate incidents during which police had violently assaulted
them or during which they had observed police assaulting other refugees.
One woman complained that she had been raped by a police officer in the
camps.
177. In addition, refugees reported that the police failed to respond to
allegations of sexual violence within the camps. In particular, a lack of
capacity and expertise impeded the prevention, investigation and
prosecution of acts of sexual violence. International policing standards
required 1 police officer per 400 people. Although Kenya’s official average
was 1 per 800 people, the official ration in the camps was 1 per 5500
people. There were reports that the police would not investigate crimes
unless the victims could pay them, and in other cases it was alleged that
investigations were discontinued and perpetrators were released upon the
payment of a bribe. According to UNHCR, in 2009 police in the camps
prosecuted sixteen cases of sexual and gender-based violence of which
seven resulted in convictions, six in acquittals, and three remained pending
at the end of the year.
178. Human Rights Watch also reported that since the early 1990s,
Kenya had adopted an informal encampment policy for most refugees,
restricting their movement to the limited confines of the refugee camps.
Refugees found outside the camps without “movement passes” were
arrested, fined and imprisoned for months at a time.
7. International Displacement Monitoring Centre – Somalia: Political
and security crises, access limits and donor cuts increasing IDP
vulnerability (10 December 2009)
179. The International Displacement Monitoring Centre estimated that
as of November 2009 1.55 million people were internally displaced in south
and central Somalia. Many IDPs had fled from the conflict in Mogadishu.
Hundreds of mini-buses were ferrying people out of the city but, as a result
of high demand, the cost of transportation was going up daily and many
people were being forced to remain in the city.
180. Some IDPs had fled from conflict in other areas of southern and
central Somalia. The report noted that people in Beletweyne, Kismayo and
Afmadow had been displaced as a result of fighting in late 2009. In
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 41
addition, up to 90 percent of the population of Dhuusamarreeb and Guriceel
towns in the Galgaduud region of central Somalia fled their homes after
fighting began in December 2008. Many of these people had already been
displaced as a result of the fighting in Mogadishu.
181. Many of the displaced from Mogadishu moved to the already
overcrowded settlements that lined the 30 kilometre road between
Mogadishu and Afgooye. UNHCR had estimated that in November 2009
there were 610,000 IDPs around Afgooye, 370,000 around Mogadishu,
150,000 in Galgadud, 70,000 in Galkayo (Puntland), 66,000 in Baydhaba
and 51,000 in Hiran. However, due to the security situation, it was
extremely difficult to verify these figures.
182. The report further noted that half of the population in Somalia was
believed to be in need of humanitarian assistance but the continuing
insecurity was preventing the delivery of essential supplies. In May 2009
militia had attacked a UNICEF warehouse. In July 2009 camps in Jowhar
hosting 49,000 IDPs were cut off from assistance as the WFP was unable to
distribute food due to insecurity. In August 2009 UNICEF were forced to
suspend the dispatch of hundreds of tons of supplies for the prevention and
treatment of acute malnutrition. Targeting of humanitarian workers has also
affected delivery of aid to needy populations. From 2008 to November 2009
some 42 aid workers had been killed, 33 had been abducted and
10 remained in captivity.
183. In July 2009 al-Shabaab announced a ban on a number of UN
agencies in areas of southern and central Somalia under its control,
including the United Nations Development Agency. Towards the end of
November 2009 al-Shabaab demanded that WFP stop importing food into
Somalia from January 2010 and instead buy local produce, despite the fact
that the country could not meet the food needs of its population. Despite the
threats, WFP managed to provide food through local and international
partners where security permitted. In the first half of 2009, WFP provided
food aid to 2.87 million Somalis. UNICEF and other agencies continued to
provide health care and water, sanitation and health programmes in IDP
settlements. However, the security situation had impacted these
programmes.
184. Aid work had also been impacted by funding cuts. The USA had
withheld millions of dollars from UN agencies, possibly due to a fear that
donations may reach al-Shabaab, which was thought to have growing ties
with al-Qaeda. In November 2009 WFP reported that its food supply to
Somalia had been effectively broken as a result of the USA’s policy as it
had been the largest donor to the WFP.
185. In September 2009 Oxfam reported that poor sanitation and the
lack of access to basic services were creating a public health emergency in
IDP camps. It described the Afgooye camps as “the world’s densest
concentration of displaced people” and described the situation as “a human
42 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
tragedy of ‘unthinkable proportions’”. The camps were also vulnerable to
environmental problems. In October 2009 flash floods hit IDP camps in
Kismayo and Mogadishu and destroyed the makeshift shelters of thousands
of people. In Kismayo, rains left an estimated 36,000 people homeless and
exposed them to mosquitoes and other hygiene-related problems.
186. The report noted that close to 80 percent of the Somali population
had no access to safe water and nearly 50 percent had no access to
sanitation. Many displaced women were forced to walk up to 10 kilometres
each day to fetch water, increasing the risk of being attacked or raped by
militias. IDPs often had to pay to use the latrines in the camps in addition to
paying rent. As a result, many camps were littered with garbage and faeces,
increasing the incidence of disease.
8. The World Food Programme (“WFP)”
187. On 5 January 2010 the WFP issued a statement reporting that:
“Rising threats and attacks on humanitarian operations, as well as the imposition of
a string of unacceptable demands from armed groups, have made it virtually
impossible for the World Food Programme (WFP) to continue reaching up to one
million people in need in southern Somalia.
WFP’s humanitarian operations in southern Somalia have been under escalating
attacks from armed groups, leading to this partial suspension of humanitarian food
distributions in much of southern Somalia.
WFP’s offices in Wajid, Buale, Garbahare, Afmadow, Jilib and Beletweyne in
southern Somalia are temporarily closed, and food supplies and equipment have been
moved, along with staff, to safer areas in order to ensure that food assistance
continues to reach as many vulnerable people as possible.”
188. The Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) reported
in its Special Brief – Post-Deyr ‘09/10 Analysis issued on 12 February 2010
that Somalia has:
“... 42% of the population, or an estimated 3.2 million people, in need of emergency
humanitarian assistance and/or livelihood support until June 2010. The results indicate
that although there are some positive indicators in terms of the lifting of the livestock
export ban and improved crop and livestock production in southern parts of the
country, the food security and nutrition situation in central regions remains in crisis,
where 70% of the population require assistance. The situation is exacerbated by
escalating conflict and displacements, creating a double burden for drought affected
populations in central regions, having to support those recently displaced yet with
reduced access to assistance from aid agencies due to the insecurity.
Emergency levels of acute malnutrition continue to be reported, with 1 in 6 children
in Somalia acutely malnourished and in need of specialist care. Of these children, 1 in
22 is severely malnourished and at a 9 times increased risk of death compared to well-
nourished children. However, in south and central Somalia the rates are higher, with 1
in 5 children acutely malnourished of which 1 in 20 is severely malnourished. These
national rates of acute malnutrition continue to be amongst the highest in the world.
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 43
Currently, these rates translate into estimated 240,000 children under 5 years of age in
Somalia being acutely malnourished, of which 63,000 are severely malnourished.
More than two thirds of these children are located in south and central Somalia, the
areas most affected by the current conflict. The people currently in crisis include 1.25
million rural people affected by drought, 580,000 urban people who struggle with
very high food and non-food prices, and 1.39 million internally displaced people
(IDPs) who are fleeing from the conflict.”
9. Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF)
189. In a report of 21 December 2009, entitled “Top ten under-reported
humanitarian stories of 2009, MSF described the situation in Somalia as
follows:
“In 2009, the Somali population continued to fall victim to indiscriminate violence,
while severe drought plagued parts of the country. Millions of people urgently require
health care, yet the enormous gap between the needs of Somalis and the humanitarian
response on the ground continues to widen. Ongoing abductions and killings of
international and Somali aid workers is thwarting the efforts of humanitarian
organizations to respond, and the public health-care system remains in near total
collapse.
...The impact of such high levels of violence and insecurity stretches far beyond
MSF’s surgical units, contributing to a general lack of access to basic lifesaving
medical care countrywide. MSF’s ability to provide assistance was further diminished
when in April two MSF staff members were abducted in Huddur in Bakool region
leading to the closure of its largest health centre in south and central Somalia and four
other health posts. In June an MSF employee died in an explosion in Belet Weyne,
Hiraan region, which killed 30 other people. In July, the heightened insecurity forced
MSF, for the first time in 17 years, to close activities in its pediatric hospital and three
other health clinics in northern Mogadishu as staff were forced to flee for their own
safety.
Another major challenge is the lack of qualified medical staff in Somalia, with so
many health workers among those who have fled the violence and no medical
universities open. In December 2008, there was a ray of hope with the graduation of
20 doctors from Benadir University in Mogadishu—the first graduating class of new
physicians in two decades. This hope was short-lived with the bombing of the next
graduation ceremony on December 3, 2009, killing 23 people, mostly graduates, and
wounding more than 50 others.
The lack of free medical care available throughout the country exacerbates the
health issues people face as a result of chronic poverty and this year’s severe drought.
Although little reliable data is available at the national level, health-care indicators in
Somalia are among the worst in terms of immunization, maternal mortality,
malnutrition and access to basic health care services. According to the World Health
Organization, women have a one in ten lifetime risk of dying during pregnancy or
childbirth. One in five children under the age of five is acutely malnourished.”
44 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
F. Recent news reports
190. On 16 September 2010 IRIN reported that property owners in
Somalia’s Afgooye corridor were selling the land on which thousands of
IDPs had been settled for years, displacing them anew. The new landlords
were building structures for rent, but few could afford to pay the prices
asked. Some well-placed sources had heard reports that the people buying
the land had links with piracy.
191. On 1 October 2010 the UN News Centre reported that according to
UNHCR estimates, 410,000 IDPs from Mogadishu had sought refuge in the
Afgooye corridor, which represented a considerable increase from 366,000
in September 2009. This increase was thought to be a reflection of the
deteriorating security in the city since 2007. In addition to the 410,000 IDPs
living in Afgooye, there were another 55,000 displaced people in Dayniile,
north of Mogadishu, 15,200 in the Bal’cad corridor in the northern
periphery of city, and 7,260 others in Kax Shiiqaal in the western outskirts.
Mogadishu itself had an estimated 372,000 IDPs.
192. The report noted that there had been a rapid urbanisation of the
Afgooye corridor, which was clearly apparent in the satellite imagery.
Structures in Afgooye were becoming more permanent as hopes faded for a
safe return to the capital any time soon. According to UNHCR, living
conditions in the Afgooye corridor were extremely difficult, with people
struggling to feed themselves and lacking other basic necessities, while as
the precarious security situation prevented humanitarian agencies from
accessing those in need. Some assistance was getting there through local
partners, but the amounts were minuscule compared to the needs.
193. The Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia,
Augustine Mahiga, said that without peace in southern and central Somalia,
it would be difficult to envisage profound and lasting changes in the
precarious human rights situation there, especially with regard to the right to
life, and even basic human rights such as the right to food, shelter, education
and health.
194. On 3 February 2011 the Guardian reported that Somalia was once
again facing a malnutrition crisis. An estimated 2.4 million people – about a
third of Somalia’s population – required humanitarian aid after the failure of
recent rains and drought had overtaken insecurity as the leading cause of
displacement. In fact, it was reported that as a consequence of the drought,
the exodus from conflict-racked Mogadishu in recent years had been
reversed, with thousands of people now leaving the countryside for the
capital in search of food and water.
195. On 17 February 2011 UN News Centre reported that severe drought
in Somalia was once again exacerbating the humanitarian crisis with more
people becoming internally displaced and others moving into refugee camps
across the border in Kenya. Malnutrition rates among children, already
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 45
above emergency levels in Somalia, had risen and an estimated 2.4 million
people – 32 per cent of the country’s 7.2 million people – were in need of
relief aid.
THE LAW
196. Given their similar factual and legal background, the Court decides
that the two applications should be joined pursuant to Rule 42 § 1 of the
Rules of Court.
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF
THE CONVENTION
197. The applicants complained that their removal to Mogadishu would
expose them to a real risk of being subjected to treatment in breach of
Article 3 of the Convention and/or a violation of Article 2 of the
Convention. Articles 2 and 3 provide, so far as relevant, as follows:
“Article 2
1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his
life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
...
Article 3
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.”
They further complained that their removal would constitute a
disproportionate interference with their rights under Article 8 of the
Convention, which provides:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
198. The Government contested those arguments.
199. The Court considers that it is more appropriate to deal with the
complaints under Articles 2 and 8 of the Convention in the context of its
46 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
examination of the related complaint under Article 3 and will proceed on
this basis (Said v. the Netherlands, no. 2345/02, § 37, ECHR 2005-VI;
D. v. the United Kingdom, 2 May 1997, § 59, Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1997-III; and NA. v. the United Kingdom, no. 25904/07, § 95,
17 July 2008).
A. Admissibility
1. The parties’ submissions
200. The Government submitted that the applicants had failed to exhaust
domestic remedies as they did not make fresh claims for asylum under
paragraph 353 of the Immigration Rules HC 395 (as amended) in light of
the developing situation in Mogadishu. They further submitted that the
second applicant also failed to exhaust domestic remedies as he had not
applied for an order for reconsideration of the Asylum and Immigration
Tribunal’s decision pursuant to section 103 of the Nationality, Immigration
and Asylum Act 2002.
201. Alternatively, the Government submitted that the applicants’
complaints under Article 3 of the Convention were manifestly ill-founded.
202. The applicants submitted that they had exhausted all domestic
remedies. First, they submitted that paragraph 353 did not provide a remedy
which they were required to exhaust, as the making of a fresh claim was a
discretionary remedy and not an automatic right. Secondly, even if
paragraph 353 did provide a remedy which they were required to exhaust,
the applicants submitted that they were unable to make a fresh claim as the
content of their claims had already been considered and they were not in
possession of material which could be considered to be “significantly
different” to that previously considered. Thirdly, as the applicants had not
been found to be credible, in practice any fresh claim would have had
virtually no prospect of success.
203. The second applicant further submitted that he did not seek an
order for reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision because he was advised
both by his lawyer, a senior lawyer from the Refugee Legal Centre, and
Counsel, a highly experienced asylum practitioner, that there were
insufficient grounds on which to challenge the decision. The Court had
always held that experienced counsel’s opinion to the effect that a remedy
had no prospect of success was enough to indicate that an appeal would not
be successful (O’Reilly and Others v. Ireland, no. 54725/00, 29 July 2004
and H. v. the United Kingdom, 8 July 1987, Series A no. 120).
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 47
2. The Court’s assessment
204. The Court recalls that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies
in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention requires applicants first to use the
remedies provided by the national legal system, thus dispensing States from
answering before the Court for their acts before they have had an
opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system. The burden
of proof is on the Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court
that an effective remedy was available in theory and in practice at the
relevant time, namely, that the remedy was accessible, capable of providing
redress in respect of the applicant’s complaints and offered reasonable
prospects of success (see T. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24724/94,
16 December 1999, § 55). Article 35 must also be applied to reflect the
practical realities of the applicant’s position in order to ensure the effective
protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention (Hilal
v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 45276/99, 8 February 2000).
205. The Court has consistently held that mere doubts as to the prospects
of success of national remedies do not absolve an applicant from the
obligation to exhaust those remedies (see, inter alia, Pellegrini v. Italy
(dec.), no. 77363/01, 26 May 2005; MPP Golub v. Ukraine (dec.),
no. 6778/05, 18 October 2005; and Milosevic v. the Netherlands (dec.),
no. 77631/01, 19 March 2002). However, it has also on occasion found that
where an applicant is advised by counsel that an appeal offers no prospects
of success, that appeal does not constitute an effective remedy
(see Selvanayagam v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 57981/00,
12 December 2002; see also H. v. the United Kingdom, cited above; and
McFeeley and others v. the United Kingdom, no. 8317/78, Commission
decision of 15 May 1980, Decisions and Reports (DR) 20, p. 44). Equally,
an applicant cannot be regarded as having failed to exhaust domestic
remedies if he or she can show, by providing relevant domestic case-law or
any other suitable evidence, that an available remedy which he or she has
not used was bound to fail (Kleyn and Others v. the Netherlands [GC],
nos. 39343/98, 39651/98, 43147/98 and 46664/99, § 156, ECHR 2003-VI;
Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, no. 1948/04, §§ 121 et seq.,
ECHR 2007-... (extracts)).
206. The Court accepts that where there has been a significant change in
either the applicant’s circumstances or the conditions in his country of
origin, making further submissions under paragraph 353 of the Immigration
Rules could constitute an effective domestic remedy which an applicant
would be required to exhaust. However, in the present case the Court recalls
that after the applicants’ complaints were considered by the Asylum and
Immigration Tribunal, the Tribunal considered a number of other
complaints by applicants challenging their removal to Mogadishu. Prior to
the Country Guidance decision of AM & AM (Somalia), which was
promulgated towards the end of 2008, the Tribunal had consistently held
48 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
that the situation in Mogadishu, and in Somalia generally, was not
sufficiently grave to place anyone being returned at risk of serious harm and
that members of majority clans could still look to their clan for protection.
As the first applicant’s claim to be a member of a minority clan had not
been believed and the second applicant had accepted that he was a member
of a majority clan, the Court does not accept that there was a reasonable
prospect that the Secretary of State for the Home Department would have
accepted any further submissions by the applicants as amounting to fresh
claims for asylum prior to the decision in AM & AM (armed conflict: risk
categories) Somalia CG [2008] UKAIT 00091.
207. In AM & AM (Somalia) the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal
found that the situation in Mogadishu had changed significantly and that it
was no longer a safe place to live for the majority of its citizens.
Nevertheless, it also found that it would be possible for persons from
Mogadishu to relocate safely within Somalia. In view of this finding, the
Court considers it likely that even if the applicants had made further
representations following the decision in AM & AM (Somalia), and even if
the Secretary of State had considered those representations to amount to a
fresh claim for asylum, such a claim would not have been successful as the
applicants would have been considered to have had an internal flight
alternative within Somalia.
208. Consequently, in the circumstances of the present case, the Court
does not consider that paragraph 353 of the Immigration Rules HC 396
(as amended) provided the applicants with an effective domestic remedy
which offered reasonable prospects of success. It therefore rejects the
Government’s submission that the applicants failed to exhaust domestic
remedies on account of the fact that they did not make further
representations to the Secretary of State for the Home Department when the
situation in Somalia worsened.
209. With regard to the Government’s submission that the second
applicant failed to exhaust domestic remedies as he did not apply for an
order for reconsideration, the Court recalls that he was advised by a senior
lawyer from the Refugee Legal Centre and by experienced counsel that such
an application would have had no realistic prospect of success. The Court
notes that both the lawyer and counsel advising the second applicant were
senior and experienced specialists in the immigration and asylum fields. In
these circumstances, the Court has no hesitation in concluding that it was
“settled legal opinion” that the applicant would not have succeeded in an
application for reconsideration.
210. The Court therefore also rejects the Government’s submission that
the second applicant failed to exhaust an effective domestic remedy by
failing to apply for reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision.
211. Finally, the Court recalls that the Government have also submitted
that the applicants’ complaints are manifestly ill-founded. The Court
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 49
considers that this submission raises questions which are closely linked to
the merits of the case. It will therefore deal with that submission in its
examination of the merits below. It further notes that the application is not
inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. General principles applicable in expulsion cases
212. It is settled case-law that Contracting States have the right as a
matter of international law and subject to their treaty obligations, including
the Convention, to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens
(Üner v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 46410/99, § 54, ECHR 2006-....;
Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, judgment of
28 May 1985, Series A no. 94, p. 34, § 67, Boujlifa v. France, judgment of
21 October 1997, Reports 1997-VI, p. 2264, § 42). The right to political
asylum is also not contained in either the Convention or its Protocols
(Salah Sheekh, cited above, § 135, with further authorities). However,
expulsion by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Article 3,
and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention,
where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person
concerned, if deported, faces a real risk of being subjected to treatment
contrary to Article 3. In such a case, Article 3 implies an obligation not to
deport the person in question to that country (Saadi v. Italy [GC],
no. 37201/06, § 125, 28 February 2008). As the prohibition of torture and of
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is absolute, irrespective of
the victims conduct, the nature of the offence allegedly committed by the
applicants is irrelevant for the purposes of Article 3 (see Chahal v. the
United Kingdom, judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports 1996-V, § 79;
and Saadi v. Italy, cited above, § 127). Consequently, the conduct of the
applicants, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be taken into account
(Saadi v. Italy [GC], § 138).
213. The assessment whether there are substantial grounds for believing
that the applicant faces such a real risk inevitably requires that the Court
assess the conditions in the receiving country against the standards of
Article 3 of the Convention (Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC],
nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, § 67, ECHR 2005-I). These standards imply
that the ill-treatment the applicant alleges he will face if returned must attain
a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The
assessment of this is relative, depending on all the circumstances of the case
(Hilal v. the United Kingdom, no. 45276/99, § 60, ECHR 2001-II). Owing
to the absolute character of the right guaranteed, Article 3 of the Convention
may also apply where the danger emanates from persons or groups of
persons who are not public officials. However, it must be shown that the
50 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
risk is real and that the authorities of the receiving State are not able to
obviate the risk by providing appropriate protection (H.L.R. v. France,
judgment of 29 April 1997, Reports 1997-III, § 40).
214. The assessment of the existence of a real risk must necessarily be a
rigorous one (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 15 November
1996, Reports 1996-V, § 96; and Saadi v. Italy, cited above, § 128). It is in
principle for the applicant to adduce evidence capable of proving that there
are substantial grounds for believing that, if the measure complained of
were to be implemented, he would be exposed to a real risk of being
subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (see N. v. Finland, no. 38885/02,
§ 167, 26 July 2005). Where such evidence is adduced, it is for the
Government to dispel any doubts about it.
215. If the applicant has not yet been extradited or deported when the
Court examines the case, the relevant time will be that of the proceedings
before the Court (see Saadi v. Italy, cited above, § 133). A full and ex nunc
assessment is called for as the situation in a country of destination may
change in the course of time. Even though the historical position is of
interest in so far as it may shed light on the current situation and its likely
evolution, it is the present conditions which are decisive and it is therefore
necessary to take into account information that has come to light after the
final decision taken by the domestic authorities (see Salah Sheekh, cited
above, § 136).
216. The foregoing principles, and in particular the need to examine all
the facts of the case, require that this assessment must focus on the
foreseeable consequences of the removal of the applicant to the country of
destination. This in turn must be considered in the light of the general
situation there as well as the applicant’s personal circumstances (Vilvarajah
and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 30 October 1991, Series A
no. 215, § 108). In this connection, and where it is relevant to do so, the
Court will have regard to whether there is a general situation of violence
existing in the country of destination.
217. In Vilvarajah v. the United Kingdom the Court appeared to suggest
that a mere situation of general instability would only give rise to a breach
of Article 3 of the Convention if there was evidence to demonstrate that the
applicant’s personal situation was worse than that of the generality of other
members of his group (Vilvarajah v. the United Kingdom, cited above,
§ 111). However, in N.A. v. the United Kingdom the Court expressly
considered its earlier decision in Vilvarajah v. the United Kingdom and
concluded that it should not be interpreted so as to require an applicant to
show the existence of special distinguishing features if he could otherwise
show that the general situation of violence in the country of destination was
of a sufficient level of intensity to create a real risk that any removal to that
country would violate Article 3 of the Convention (N.A. v. the United
Kingdom, cited above, §§ 115 – 116). To insist in such cases that the
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 51
applicant show the existence of such special distinguishing features would
render the protection offered by Article 3 illusory (N.A. v. the United
Kingdom, cited above, § 116). Moreover, such a finding would call into
question the absolute nature of Article 3, which prohibits in absolute terms
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
218. Therefore, following NA v. the United Kingdom, the sole question
for the Court to consider in an expulsion case is whether, in all the
circumstances of the case before it, substantial grounds have been shown for
believing that the person concerned, if returned, would face a real risk of
being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. If the
existence of such a risk is established, the applicant’s removal would
necessarily breach Article 3, regardless of whether the risk emanates from a
general situation of violence, a personal characteristic of the applicant, or a
combination of the two. However, it is clear that not every situation of
general violence will give rise to such a risk. On the contrary, the Court has
made it clear that a general situation of violence would only be of sufficient
intensity to create such a risk “in the most extreme cases” where there was a
real risk of ill-treatment simply by virtue of an individual being exposed to
such violence on return (ibid., § 115).
219. Accordingly, in the present case the Court must examine whether
substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the applicants, if
deported, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to
Article 3. In doing so, it will first consider the general situation both in
Mogadishu, which will be the point of their return, and in the remainder of
southern and central Somalia before focusing on the foreseeable
consequences of removal for each of the applicants. However, before it can
begin its assessment of risk on return, it must address two preliminary issues
which have arisen in the present case: first, the relationship between
Article 3 of the Convention and article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive,
and secondly, the weight to be attached to country reports which primarily
rely on information provided by anonymous sources.
2. The relationship between Article 3 of the Convention and article
15(c) of the Qualification Directive
(a) The parties’ submissions
220. The applicants suggested that article 15(c) was clearly intended to
provide for situations falling short of the protection provided both by
article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive and Article 3 of the Convention.
They therefore accepted that there might be some circumstances in which a
serious threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate
violence would not, without more, be sufficient to constitute a violation of
Article 3 of the Convention. However, they submitted that in the context of
52 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
their proposed removal, the threat presented was such that the threshold
envisaged in NA v. the United Kingdom had been exceeded.
221. The Government submitted that both the ECJ in Elgafaji and the
Court of Appeal in QD (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
had correctly adopted the approach that article 15(c) of the Qualification
Directive was distinct from Article 3 of the Convention and, as such, it
enabled Member States of the European Union to offer protection to asylum
seekers over and above the minimum standards imposed by Article 3.
222. In particular, the Government submitted that this interpretation was
consistent with the overall objective of the Qualification Directive, which
was to set “minimum standards for the qualification and status of third
country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who
otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection
granted”. As such, it combined the traditional criteria contained in the
Geneva Convention with the concept of “subsidiary protection status”,
which drew together the international obligation of Member States as set out
in the European Convention on Human Rights with the broader
humanitarian practices adopted by Member States towards individuals
manifestly in need of protection who did not necessarily qualify under either
Convention.
223. The fact that the European Union had adopted a broader scope for
subsidiary protection did not mean that the same should necessarily be
transplanted into Article 3. That was not what was intended by the adoption
of the Directive, which clearly chose a wider scope than that of the
Convention. Rather, the Government submitted that the more broadly-based
standard of protection adopted by the European Union might not be
appropriate across the wider membership of the Council of Europe,
particularly in the absence of the express agreement of the Contracting
States.
224. Allied to this, the Government submitted that the rigours of the
Qualification Directive were mitigated by a number of exclusions set out in
article 17 which were based on the conduct of the individual. However, if
article 15(c) were to be subsumed into Article 3 of the Convention, these
exclusions would not similarly be incorporated.
(b) The Court’s assessment
225. In Elgafaji the ECJ held that article 15(c) would be violated where
substantial grounds were shown for believing that a civilian, returned to the
relevant country, would, solely on account of his presence on the territory of
that country or region, face a real risk of being subjected to a threat of
serious harm. In order to demonstrate such a risk he was not required to
adduce evidence that he would be specifically targeted by reason of factors
particular to his personal circumstances (Elgafaji, cited above, § 35).
Nevertheless, the ECJ considered that such a situation would be
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 53
“exceptional” and the more the applicant could show that he was
specifically affected by reason of factors particular to his personal
circumstances, the lower the level of indiscriminate violence required for
him to be eligible for subsidiary protection (Elgafaji, cited above, § 39).
226. The jurisdiction of this Court is limited to the interpretation of the
Convention and it would not, therefore, be appropriate for it to express any
views on the ambit or scope of article 15(c) of the Qualification Direction.
However, based on the ECJ’s interpretation in Elgafaji, the Court is not
persuaded that Article 3 of the Convention, as interpreted in NA, does not
offer comparable protection to that afforded under the Directive. In
particular, it notes that the threshold set by both provisions may, in
exceptional circumstances, be attained in consequence of a situation of
general violence of such intensity that any person being returned to the
region in question would be at risk simply on account of their presence
there.
3. The weight to be attached to the report of the fact-finding mission to
Nairobi (see paragraph 80, above)
(a) The parties’ submissions
227. The applicants submitted that following NA. v. the United
Kingdom, no. 25904/07, §§ 118 – 122, 17 July 2008, little or no weight
should be attached to the report of the fact-finding mission as it did not visit
Somalia, did not appear to contact anyone in Somalia, and the majority of
“sources” were anonymous, identified only as “an international NGO”,
“a diplomatic source”, or “security advisors”. No information was provided
about the extent of the sources’ presence in Somalia, their roles within their
respective organisations, or the type of work (if any) that they carried out in
Somalia. This was of particular concern on account of the fact that so few
international NGOs and diplomatic missions had any presence in Somalia.
228. In response, the Government submitted that such criticisms were
misplaced and unjustified. Although they acknowledged that the mission
did not travel to Somalia, they claimed that this was pursuant to advice
provided by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office which warned British
nationals against travel to Somalia. The Mission went instead to Nairobi,
which was the location of the African Headquarters of the United Nations,
the location of the highest concentration of inter-governmental and
non-governmental organisations operating in and with daily contact to the
situation in Somalia. In Nairobi, the Mission was able to interview a number
of contacts who had recently returned to Nairobi from Somalia, some of
whom had been in Somalia for a number of weeks in the period
immediately preceding the mission.
229. The Government further acknowledged that the majority of sources
were not named in the report. However, they submitted that anonymity had
54 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
been granted at the sources’ request as they were concerned about the risk to
their operations and staff and they asked the Court to take notice of the fact
that the sources cited in the report by the Norwegian Directorate of
Immigration were also anonymous.
(b) The Court’s assessment
230. In assessing the weight to be attributed to country material,
consideration must be given to its source, in particular its independence,
reliability and objectivity. In respect of reports, the authority and reputation
of the author, the seriousness of the investigations by means of which they
were compiled, the consistency of their conclusions and their corroboration
by other sources are all relevant considerations (Saadi v. Italy [GC],
no. 37201/06, § 143, ECHR 2008-... and NA. v. the United Kingdom, cited
above, § 120).
231. The Court also recognises that consideration must be given to the
presence and reporting capacities of the author of the material in the country
in question. In this respect, the Court observes that States (whether the
respondent State in a particular case or any other Contracting or non-
Contracting State), through their diplomatic missions and their ability to
gather information, will often be able to provide material which may be
highly relevant to the Court’s assessment of the case before it. It finds that
the same consideration must apply, a fortiori, in respect of agencies of the
United Nations, particularly given their direct access to the authorities of the
country of destination as well as their ability to carry out on-site inspections
and assessments in a manner which States and non-governmental
organisations may not be able to do.
232. The Court appreciates the many difficulties faced by governments
and NGOs gathering information in dangerous and volatile situations. It
accepts that it will not always be possible for investigations to be carried out
in the immediate vicinity of a conflict and, in such cases, information
provided by sources with first-hand knowledge of the situation may have to
be relied on. The Court will not, therefore, disregard a report simply on
account of the fact that its author did not visit the area in question and
instead relied on information provided by sources.
233. That being said, where a report is wholly reliant on information
provided by sources, the authority and reputation of those sources and the
extent of their presence in the relevant area will be relevant factors for the
Court in assessing the weight to be attributed to their evidence. The Court
recognises that where there are legitimate security concerns, sources may
wish to remain anonymous. However, in the absence of any information
about the nature of the sources’ operations in the relevant area, it will be
virtually impossible for the Court to assess their reliability. Consequently,
the approach taken by the Court will depend on the consistency of the
sources’ conclusions with the remainder of the available information. Where
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 55
the sources’ conclusions are consistent with other country information, their
evidence may be of corroborative weight. However, the Court will generally
exercise caution when considering reports from anonymous sources which
are inconsistent with the remainder of the information before it.
234. In the present case the Court observes that the description of the
sources relied on by the fact-finding mission is vague. As indicated by the
applicants, the majority of sources have simply been described either as “an
international NGO”, “a diplomatic source”, or “a security advisor”. Such
descriptions give no indication of the authority or reputation of the sources
or of the extent of their presence in southern and central Somalia. This is of
particular concern in the present case, where it is accepted that the presence
of international NGOs and diplomatic missions in southern and central
Somalia is limited. It is therefore impossible for the Court to carry out any
assessment of the sources’ reliability and, as a consequence, where their
information is unsupported or contradictory, the Court is unable to attach
substantial weight to it.
4. The security situation in Mogadishu
(a) The parties’ submissions
235. The applicants submitted that there had been increasing violence in
Mogadishu following the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in January 2009.
Human Rights Watch described how Mogadishu had been torn apart by
“indiscriminate warfare”, while UNHCR reported that both al-Shabaab and
Hizbul Islam had been accused of using the civilian population as human
shields. In 2010 the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal in AM (Somalia)
held that the situation in Mogadishu was such that everyone except possibly
prominent businessmen or senior figures in the insurgency or in powerful
criminal gangs would be at risk if returned there (see paragraph 66, above).
The background information post-dating AM (Somalia) showed that the
situation had since deteriorated (see, for example, paragraphs 121, 123 and
127, above).
236. The applicants submitted that the number of civilian casualties in
Mogadishu had been immeasurable and the level of violence was only set to
increase. They had obtained a witness statement from a Mr Kahiye Alim, a
lawyer who had recently spoken with both General Ahmed Jumal Geedi, the
Chief of Army Staff, and Mr Warsame Mohammed Hassan, the Second
Deputy Mayor of Mogadishu. Mr Alim had been informed that with the
assistance of the new Ugandan troops, the Transitional Federal Government,
with the assistance of AMISOM, intended to go on the offensive and retake
those parts of Mogadishu which were under the control of al-Shabaab. He
had also been informed that following the attempted suicide bombings at
Mogadishu International Airport on 9 September 2010, the airport had been
subject to daily shelling and bombing.
56 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
237. The applicants therefore submitted that the indiscriminate violence
in Mogadishu was currently at such a level of intensity as to pose a risk to
the life or person of any civilian in the capital.
238. The Government submitted, with reference to the most recent
country reports, that Mogadishu was by no means a “no-go area”. On the
contrary, a number of sources interviewed by the fact-finding mission had
emphasised that, despite the dangers, there was still a substantial degree of
normality in Mogadishu and that the risk to civilians appeared to be from
being caught up in the crossfire and not from being specifically targeted
(see paragraph 87, above).
239. The Government further argued that al-Shabaab had become more
sophisticated under the influence of foreign jihadists and, as a consequence,
the risks they posed to the general civilian populace appeared to have
lessened. In particular, they referred to the report of the recent fact-finding
mission, which indicated that al-Shabaab was now targeting its attacks
specifically against Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM
interests (see paragraph 83, above). The Government also referred to the
report of the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, which indicated that
although conditions varied significantly across different areas of
Mogadishu, in the areas controlled by al-Shabaab there were some positive
signs, high levels of law and order (see paragraph 115, above).
240. Consequently, the Government contended that there were no
substantial grounds for believing that the applicants’ removal to Mogadishu
would give rise to a real risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 of the
Convention.
(b) The Court’s assessment
241. In the present case the applicants submitted that the indiscriminate
violence in Mogadishu was of a sufficient level of intensity to pose a real
risk to the life or person of any civilian in the capital. Although the Court
has previously indicated that it would only be “in the most extreme cases”
that a situation of general violence would be of sufficient intensity to pose
such a risk, it has not provided any further guidance on how the intensity of
a conflict is to be assessed. However, the Court recalls that the Asylum and
Immigration Tribunal had to conduct a similar assessment in AM and AM
(Somalia) (cited above), and in doing so it identified the following criteria:
first, whether the parties to the conflict were either employing methods and
tactics of warfare which increased the risk of civilian casualties or directly
targeting civilians; secondly, whether the use of such methods and/or tactics
was widespread among the parties to the conflict; thirdly, whether the
fighting was localised or widespread; and finally, the number of civilians
killed, injured and displaced as a result of the fighting. While these criteria
are not to be seen as an exhaustive list to be applied in all future cases, in
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 57
the context of the present case the Court considers that they form an
appropriate yardstick by which to assess the level of violence in Mogadishu.
242. It is not in dispute that towards the end of 2008 Mogadishu was not
a safe place to live for the great majority of its citizens. In the most recent
Country Guideline determination, AM & AM (Somalia) (cited above), the
then Asylum and Immigration Tribunal carefully considered the intensity of
the fighting, the security situation and the extent of the population
displacement and concluded that the armed conflict in Mogadishu amounted
to indiscriminate violence of such a level of severity as to place the majority
of the population at risk of serious harm. However, it did not rule out that
there might be certain individuals who on the facts might be considered to
be able to live safely in the city, for example if they had close connections
with powerful actors in Mogadishu, such as prominent businessmen or
senior figures in the insurgency or in powerful criminal gangs.
243. The objective information would appear to suggest that the
situation in Mogadishu improved in 2009. The United Kingdom Border and
Immigration Agency Operational Guidance Note of 1 July 2010 indicated
that a fall in clashes between government troops and insurgents had led to a
substantial drop in the numbers of civilians killed in fighting in Mogadishu
in 2009 (see paragraph 99, above). This conclusion was offered some
support by the report of the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration Country
of Origin Centre, which recorded that although the civilian population of
Mogadishu was still the victim of indiscriminate violence, it was “to a
slightly lesser extent than previously” (see paragraph 111, above).
244. Nevertheless, the most recent reports indicate that all significant
parties to the conflict have continued to engage in indiscriminate violence,
conducting numerous mortar attacks against enemy forces in densely
populated areas of Mogadishu without regard to the civilian population.
Moreover, all parties have continued to use mortars without spotters or
guidance systems, firing indiscriminately in the general direction of
opposition fire or bombarding areas such as Bakara Market which were
considered to be opposition strongholds (see paragraphs 82, 123, 127, 132,
137, 139-140 and 160, above).
245. Furthermore, the reports indicate that the security situation in
Mogadishu deteriorated in 2010. On 9 September 2010 the
Secretary-General of the United Nations reported that volatility and
insecurity had increased in Mogadishu (see paragraph 123, above) and on
16 September 2010 Shamsul Bari, the Independent Expert, reported that at
the time of drafting his report fighting had once again broken out in
Mogadishu and hospitals were swamped with war-wounded (see paragraph
127, above). Estimates of civilian casualties and displaced persons vary
from one report to another. The Secretary General reported that from
20 March 2010 to 11 July 2010 approximately 1,600 civilian casualties had
been admitted to the two main hospitals in Mogadishu (see paragraph 123,
58 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
above). In addition, 179,000 people had been displaced in Mogadishu
during the first quarter of 2010 and a further 75,000 people had been
displaced during the second quarter. The UNHCR reported that 20-50
civilians were dying each week in Mogadishu and that there had been over
900 civilian casualties in Mogadishu in March and April 2010
(see paragraph 132, above). Amnesty International’s Briefing Paper of
18 October 2010 suggested that a further 230 civilians had been killed and
400 injured in fighting during the last week of August 2010 and the first
week of September 2010 and that 42,400 people had been displaced from
around and within Mogadishu since 23 August 2010 (see paragraphs 145
and 148, above). Meanwhile, the Independent Expert referred to statistics
produced by the Elman Peace Centre of Somalia, which recorded that
918 civilians had died in the first seven months of 2010 and a further 2,555
were injured (see paragraph 127, above).
246. Whatever the precise figures, it is clear that since the beginning of
2010 the ongoing fighting in Mogadishu has resulted in thousands of
civilian casualties and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people.
Although there were reports that al-Shabaab’s tactics had become more
sophisticated following the recruitment of foreign fighters, none of the
reports suggested that the use of new tactics had in any way reduced the risk
to civilians. On the contrary, one source told the fact-finding mission that
the new tactics introduced by foreign fighters included random attacks on
civilians (see paragraph 83, above). The report of the Norwegian Directorate
also suggested that the professionalisation of al-Shabaab operations resulted
in their being implemented with “greater brutality” (see paragraph 112,
above).
247. The situation in Mogadishu has been described by the Norwegian
Directorate as unpredictable, capable of changing on a daily basis
(see paragraphs 110 and 118, above). While it would appear that at any
given time the fighting is more intense in some areas than in others, the
report of the Norwegian Directorate indicated that the power balance in
districts and urban areas could change almost from day to day and, as a
consequence, information on area control could become out of date very
quickly (see paragraph 110, above). In particular, the report described how
one area which had previously been considered safe was now “shot to
pieces” and all its inhabitants had fled (see paragraph 118, above).
248. The Court considers that the large quantity of objective information
overwhelmingly indicates that the level of violence in Mogadishu is of
sufficient intensity to pose a real risk of treatment reaching the Article 3
threshold to anyone in the capital. In reaching this conclusion the Court has
had regard to the indiscriminate bombardments and military offensives
carried out by all parties to the conflict, the unacceptable number of civilian
casualties, the substantial number of persons displaced within and from the
city, and the unpredictable and widespread nature of the conflict.
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 59
249. The Court notes that in AM & AM (Somalia) the Asylum and
Immigration Tribunal left open the possibility that certain individuals who
were exceptionally well-connected to “powerful actors” in Mogadishu
might be able to obtain protection and live safely in the city. The Court has
not received any submissions specifically addressed to this issue and
observes that it is one on which the country reports have been largely silent.
As Article 3 requires the decision-maker to focus on the foreseeable
consequences of removal for each individual applicant, it would not exclude
that it might be shown that a well-connected individual would be protected
in Mogadishu. However, it considers it likely that this would be rare. First,
in the light of the Tribunal decision it would appear that only connections at
the highest level would be in a position to afford such protection. For
example, it would not be enough to show that an individual was a member
of a majority clan. Secondly, it recalls that in HH (Somalia) and Others
v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 426 the
Court of Appeal found that an applicant who had not been to Somalia for
some time was unlikely to have the contacts necessary to afford him
protection on return. It is therefore unlikely that a Contracting State could
successfully raise such an argument unless the individual in question had
recently been in Somalia.
250. Consequently, the Court concludes that the violence in Mogadishu
is of such a level of intensity that anyone in the city, except possibly those
who are exceptionally well-connected to “powerful actors”, would be at real
risk of treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention.
5. Conditions in southern and central Somalia (outside Mogadishu)
(a) The parties’ submissions
251. The applicants submitted that it would be unrealistic for them to
travel to another part of southern and central Somalia. The entry point to
Somalia was Mogadishu International Airport and as a consequence of the
intense level of violence prevalent in and around Mogadishu, travelling, or
attempting to travel, from the airport to another part of southern and central
Somalia would expose them to a real risk of treatment proscribed by
Article 3.
252. The applicants relied on the UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines, which
did not consider that there was any internal flight or relocation alternative
available inside southern and central Somalia. Throughout 2009 and 2010
there had been widespread violence throughout the region and
UNHCR considered that there was substantial evidence of generalised
violence resulting in indiscriminate harm (see paragraphs 132 - 134, above).
253. In addition to the high levels of violence, there had also been a
marked increase in detention, torture, unlawful killing and “ruthless attacks”
in both Mogadishu and elsewhere in southern and central Somalia. Amnesty
60 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
International reported a worrying trend of individuals stoned to death,
publicly shot dead, amputated and flogged on the orders of quasi-judicial
bodies operated by local leaders linked to armed groups (see paragraphs
164 - 168, above).
254. The applicants further submitted that if returned to Mogadishu
there was at least a reasonable likelihood that they would be forced into IDP
camps and the dire humanitarian conditions in these camps and makeshift
settlements therefore had to be taken into account in assessing compliance
with Article 3.
255. As the IDP camps and settlements were virtually inescapable, the
applicants argued that they were similar to detention camps and, as such, the
Court should apply by analogy its jurisprudence on detention conditions.
The applicants argued that the conditions in the camps and settlements
resembled, but were very much worse than, conditions which the Court had
found to violate Article 3 in respect of detainees (see, for example,
Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907/98, ECHR 2001-II, Peers v. Greece,
no. 28524/95, ECHR 2001-III, S.D. v. Greece, no. 53541/07, 11 June 2009,
Riad and Idiab v. Belgium, nos. 29787/03 and 29810/03, ECHR 2008-...
(extracts) and Al-Agha v. Romania, no. 40933/02, 12 January 2010). They
lacked the basic necessities of life such as food, water and healthcare. The
level of violence, including violence against women and children, meant
that many lived in constant fear for their lives or physical safety. In
addition, although 70 percent of people located in the central Somalia region
were in need of humanitarian assistance, UNHCR and other NGOs
experienced insuperable difficulties in accessing many key locations. The
applicants therefore submitted that being forced to have recourse to these
camps would engage the United Kingdom’s responsibilities under Article 3
of the Convention.
256. The Government submitted that outside Mogadishu, much of
southern and central Somalia was controlled by al-Shabaab. Recent reports,
including that of the fact-finding mission, indicated that these areas were
more stable and that harvests had increased. The Government accepted that
the increased stability has carried with it an increase in human rights abuses,
apparently arising from the extreme nature of al-Shabaab’s interpretation
and application of Sharia law. However, they contended that civilians would
be safe provided that they “followed the rules”.
257. The Government observed that according to recent reports, the
travel situation within Somalia had improved significantly since early 2009.
Members of the diaspora flew to Mogadishu regularly, with an established
route from Nairobi carrying thousands of passengers in the first eight
months of 2010. From information provided to the fact-finding mission it
appeared that although returning Somalis would usually have to make
arrangements with family members to be met on their return, armed escorts
were not necessarily needed. In fact, evidence suggested that Somali
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 61
citizens could use taxis to travel from the airport to the city (see paragraphs
84 - 85, above).
258. The Government submitted that security had also improved with
regard to travel between the different regions of Somalia and the general
impression was that the population could move freely in both Government
controlled areas and areas controlled by other groups. Improved security
was in part due to the removal of many roadblocks. Although checkpoints
still operated, most of these were operated by al-Shabaab in order to check
persons and goods and to ensure that its strict Islamic codes were being
enforced. This, combined with the fact that al-Shabaab was reported to have
largely eradicated crimes such as robbery, theft and banditry, had
contributed to the reduction in the risks of travelling (see paragraph 90,
above).
259. Insofar as the applicants were relying on the “dire” humanitarian
conditions in Somalia as creating the risk of ill-treatment contrary to
Article 3 of the Convention, the Government submitted that the principles
established in N. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 26565/05, §§ 42 – 45,
27 May 2008 were applicable. Therefore, humanitarian conditions would
only reach the threshold of Article 3 if the circumstances obtaining in the
receiving State were “very exceptional”, it was “highly probable” that the
applicant would not have access to the basic necessities of life, and that
these deficiencies would result in an immediate threat to life or the
impossibility of maintaining human dignity.
260. The Government accepted that the humanitarian situation in
Somalia was undoubtedly grave. However, they believed that recent
reporting highlighted more positive signs. For example, according to
UNHCR statistics, there were considerably fewer people in the Afgooye
Corridor than there had been previously and a well-informed international
source had told the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration that the actual
number might be even lower as there was evidence to suggest that the
internal refugee figures were exaggerated.
261. Indeed, the fact-finding mission had indicated that the Afgooye
Corridor was taking on a more permanent character, with an increasing
number of businesses operating in the area. One interviewee had recorded
that satellite pictures showed evidence of settling, urbanisation and normal
life (see paragraph 95, above). Away from the Afgooye Corridor, there were
a limited number of IDP settlements as it was more common for displaced
persons to find homes with relatives in other areas. In this regard, the clan
system remained important as clan members were prepared to share
resources as far as possible.
262. The Government also noted that the recent reporting had
consistently identified an increase in human rights abuses in areas controlled
by al-Shabaab, based largely on that group’s extreme interpretation and
application of Sharia law. Women in particular were considered to be
62 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
particularly at risk of human rights abuses, although there was also a
significant risk to men and children of forced recruitment. However, the
Government submitted that while the al-Shabaab regime was undoubtedly
repressive, there was evidence to suggest that those who abided by their
rules could live their day to day lives freely (see paragraph 92, above).
263. The Government therefore submitted that the dire humanitarian
conditions which the applicants might face on return to Somalia would not
cross the “very exceptional” threshold as they could show no more than a
speculative risk, based on a “worst case scenario”.
264. Consequently, the Government submitted that the level of risk
likely to be faced by the applicants if they were to travel from Mogadishu
into central or southern Somalia was not sufficient to constitute a breach of
Article 3.
(b) The Court’s assessment
α. The internal flight alternative
265. The Court observes that in the present case the Government intends
to return both applicants to Mogadishu. However, it cannot limit its
consideration of the risk on return to an assessment of the conditions in
Mogadishu as the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal found that despite the
existence of a real risk of serious harm in the capital, it would be possible
for the applicants to relocate to a safer region in southern or central Somalia.
266. In the United Kingdom an application for asylum or for subsidiary
protection will fail if the decision-maker considers that it would be
reasonable – and not unduly harsh – to expect the applicant to relocate
(Januzi, Hamid, Gaafar and Mohammed v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2006] UKHL 5 and AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the
Home Department [2007] UKHL 49). The Court recalls that Article 3 does
not, as such, preclude Contracting States from placing reliance on the
existence of an internal flight alternative in their assessment of an
individual’s claim that a return to his country of origin would expose him to
a real risk of being subjected to treatment proscribed by that provision
(Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, no. 1948/04, § 141, ECHR 2007-I
(extracts), Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, § 98, Reports
of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V and Hilal v. the United Kingdom,
no. 45276/99, §§ 67 – 68, ECHR 2001-II). However, the Court has held that
reliance on an internal flight alternative does not affect the responsibility of
the expelling Contracting State to ensure that the applicant is not, as a result
of its decision to expel, exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the
Convention (Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, cited above, § 141 and
T.I. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 43844/98, ECHR 2000-III).
Therefore, as a precondition of relying on an internal flight alternative,
certain guarantees have to be in place: the person to be expelled must be
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 63
able to travel to the area concerned, gain admittance and settle there, failing
which an issue under Article 3 may arise, the more so if in the absence of
such guarantees there is a possibility of his ending up in a part of the
country of origin where he may be subjected to ill-treatment (Salah Sheekh
v. the Netherlands, cited above, § 141).
267. Although it is clear that Somali nationals would not be able to gain
admittance to Somaliland or Puntland unless they were born there or had
strong clan connections to the region (see paragraphs 79 and 103, above),
the Court is not aware of the existence of any similar obstacles which would
prevent a Somali returnee from gaining admittance to another part of
southern and central Somalia. However, in view of the humanitarian crisis
and the strain that it has placed both on individuals and on the traditional
clan structure, in practice the Court does not consider that a returnee could
find refuge or support in an area where he has no close family connections
(see paragraphs 114, 119 and 138, above). If a returnee either has no such
connections or if he could not safely travel to an area where he has such
connections, the Court considers it reasonably likely that he would have to
seek refuge in an IDP settlement or refugee camp. Therefore, in considering
the internal flight alternative, the Court will first consider whether a returnee
would be exposed to a risk of ill-treatment either in transit or upon settling
in another part of southern and central Somalia before considering whether
he would be at risk of ill-treatment in an IDP or refugee camp on account of
the humanitarian conditions there.
β. The risk in transit or upon settling elsewhere in southern and central
Somalia
268. Although there are a number of airports in southern and central
Somalia, all applicants facing removal from the United Kingdom have been
issued with removal directions to Mogadishu International Airport. The
airport is currently controlled by the Transitional Federal Government and
AMISOM and, as a consequence, it has been the subject of a number of
attacks by al-Shabaab (see paragraphs 71 and 85, above). Nevertheless, the
airport appears to be in regular use, with the EU Special Representative
reporting that 15 - 18 flights were arriving every day (see paragraph 84,
above). Consequently, the Court does not consider that there is a real risk
that a person being returned to southern and central Somalia would be
subjected to ill-treatment at the airport.
269. Although the Court has found that Mogadishu is not a safe place for
the majority of Somalis, it notes that a returnee could travel from
Mogadishu International Airport to another part of southern and central
Somalia without entering the city. However, the safety of this onward
journey will vary from case to case depending on the returnee’s destination.
270. The country reports indicate that there has been fighting in the
towns of Beletweyne, Kismayo, Dhusamareb, Afmadow, various towns in
64 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
the Galgaduud region, the Gedo and Bakool regions, the Lower Juba region
and Lower Shabelle (see paragraphs 100, 118, 121, 149, 161 and 179
above). Although there is little information available concerning the
intensity of the fighting in these areas, it would appear that it is the conflict
in Mogadishu which is primarily responsible for Somalia’s civilian
casualties and widespread displacement (see paragraphs 100, 109, 120,
123-124, 132, 145, 159, 169 and 178, above). Moreover, the reports
describe the fighting outside Mogadishu as sporadic and localised around
key strategic towns (see paragraphs 120 and 161, above). Consequently,
while there is fighting in some areas, other areas have remained
comparatively stable (see paragraphs 92, 120, 144 and 159, above).
271. The Court is therefore prepared to accept that it might be possible
for a returnee to travel from Mogadishu International Airport to another part
of southern and central Somalia without being exposed to a real risk of
treatment proscribed by Article 3 solely on account of the situation of
general violence. However, this will very much depend upon where a
returnee’s home area is. It is not possible for the Court to assess the level of
general violence in every part of southern and central Somalia and, even if it
were to undertake such an exercise, it is likely that its conclusions would
become outdated very quickly. Consequently, if the applicant’s home is one
which has been affected by the conflict, the conditions there will have to be
assessed against the requirements of Article 3 at the time of removal.
272. The Court observes that the situation of general violence is not the
only risk that a returnee might have to face if he were to relocate to another
part of southern and central Somalia. According to the country reports, the
areas with the lowest levels of generalised violence are the areas under the
control of al-Shabaab (see paragraphs 92 and 159, above), which are also
the areas reported to have the worst human rights conditions (see paragraphs
94, 104, 128 and164-168, above). Consequently, even if a returnee could
travel to and settle in his home area without being exposed to a real risk of
ill-treatment on account of the situation of general violence, he might still
be exposed to a real risk of ill-treatment on account of the human rights
situation.
273. It is clear that in the areas under their control al-Shabaab is
enforcing a particularly draconian version of Sharia law which goes well
beyond the traditional interpretation of Islam in Somalia (see paragraphs 94
and 164, above) and in fact amounts to “a repressive form of social control”
(see paragraph 164, above). The reports indicate that al-Shabaab are
concerned with every little detail of daily life, including men’s and women’s
style of dress, the length of men’s beards, the style of music being listened
to and the choice of mobile phone ringtone (see paragraphs 164 – 165,
above). Women appear to be particularly targeted. In addition to strict dress
codes, women in al-Shabaab controlled areas are not permitted to go out in
public with men, even with male relatives, and have been ordered to close
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 65
their shops as commercial activity permitted them to “mix with men”
(see paragraphs 104 and 166 – 167, above). There were also reports of
“systematic” forced recruitment by al-Shabaab of both adults and children
in the areas under its control (see paragraphs 91, 93, 126 and 163, above).
274. Al-Shabaab’s strict interpretation of Sharia law does not apply only
to those living in areas under its control, but also to those travelling through
these areas. According to the country reports, al-Shabaab has established
checkpoints at the exit/entry routes to towns under its control, where goods
and people are searched to ensure that its strict Islamic codes are complied
with (see paragraphs 87, 90 and 101 above). Persons not obeying al-
Shabaab’s rules could experience difficulties at these checkpoints. For
example, there were reports of women being flogged at checkpoints because
they had been sitting beside a man in a vehicle (see paragraph 167, above).
Moreover, there were also reports of young men and children being forcibly
recruited at checkpoints (see paragraphs 91, above).
275. In spite of the repressive regime in place, a number of sources told
the fact-finding mission that areas controlled by al-Shabaab were generally
safe for Somalis provided that they were able to “play the game” and avoid
the attention of al-Shabaab by obeying their rules (see paragraph 92, above).
However, as al-Shabaab only began seizing parts of southern and central
Somalia following the fall of the Union of Islamic Courts in late 2006, the
Court considers it unlikely that a Somali with no recent experience of living
in Somalia would be adequately equipped to “play the game”, with the risk
that he would come to the attention of al-Shabaab, either while travelling
through or having settled in an al-Shabaab controlled area. The Court
considers that this risk would be even greater for Somalis who have been
out of the country long enough to become “westernised” as certain
attributes, such as a foreign accent, would be impossible to disguise.
276. It is not possible to predict with any certainty the fate of a returnee
who came to the attention of al-Shabaab for failing to comply with their
rules. The reports suggest that punishments inflicted by al-Shabaab can
include stoning, amputation, flogging and corporal punishment
(see paragraphs 104 and 164 – 168, above), all of which would attain the
minimum level of severity required to fall within the scope of Article 3
(see, for example, Jabari v. Turkey, no. 40035/98, § 41, ECHR 2000-VII
and A. v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, § 22, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1998-VI). The Court accepts that in all likelihood,
the punishment would depend on the gravity of the infringement but the
Court cannot ignore reports that Somalis have been beaten or flogged for
relatively minor infringements, such as playing scrabble (see paragraph 164,
above), watching World Cup matches (see paragraph 164, above), and
wearing “inappropriate” clothing (see paragraphs 165 – 166, above).
277. Consequently, the Court considers that a returnee with no recent
experience of living in Somalia would be at real risk of being subjected to
66 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
treatment proscribed by Article 3 in an al-Shabaab controlled area.
Accordingly, if a returnee’s home area is in an al-Shabaab controlled area,
or if it could not be reached without travelling through an al-Shabaab
controlled area, the Court does not consider that he could relocate within
Somalia without being exposed to a real risk of Article 3 ill-treatment.
γ. Humanitarian conditions in refugee and IDP camps
278. In Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, cited above, the Court held that
socio-economic and humanitarian conditions in a country of return did not
necessarily have a bearing, and certainly not a decisive bearing, on the
question whether the persons concerned would face a real risk of
ill-treatment within the meaning of Article 3 in those areas (§ 141).
However, in N. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, the Court held that
although the Convention was essentially directed at the protection of civil
and political rights, the fundamental importance of Article 3 meant that it
was necessary for the Court to retain a degree of flexibility to prevent
expulsion in very exceptional cases. It therefore held that humanitarian
conditions would give rise to a breach of Article 3 of the Convention in very
exceptional cases where the humanitarian grounds against removal were
“compelling” (§ 42).
279. In the recent case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC],
no. 30696/09, 21 January 2011, the Court stated that it had not excluded the
possibility that the responsibility of the State under Article 3 might be
engaged in respect of treatment where an applicant, who was wholly
dependent on State support, found himself faced with official indifference in
a situation of serious deprivation or want incompatible with human dignity
(§ 253). In that case, the applicant had spent months living in a state of the
most extreme poverty, unable to cater for his most basic needs: food,
hygiene and a place to live. Added to that, the Court noted the applicant’s
ever-present fear of being attacked and robbed and the total lack of any
likelihood of his situation improving (§ 254). It held that the conditions in
which the applicant was living reached the Article 3 threshold and found
Greece in breach of that Article as it was the State directly responsible for
the applicant’s living conditions (§ 264). It also found Belgium to be in
breach of Article 3 because, inter alia, it had transferred the applicant to
Greece and thus knowingly exposed him to living conditions which
amounted to degrading treatment (§ 367).
280. In the present case the Government submitted, albeit prior to the
publication of the Court’s decision in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, that the
appropriate test for assessing whether dire humanitarian conditions reached
the Article 3 threshold was that set out in N. v. the United Kingdom.
Humanitarian conditions would therefore only reach the Article 3 threshold
in very exceptional cases where the grounds against removal were
“compelling”.
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 67
281. The Court recalls that N. v. the United Kingdom concerned the
removal of an HIV-positive applicant to Uganda, where her lifespan was
likely to be reduced on account of the fact that the treatment facilities there
were inferior to those available in the United Kingdom. In reaching its
conclusions, the Court noted that the alleged future harm would emanate not
from the intentional acts or omission of public authorities or non-State
bodies but from a naturally occurring illness and the lack of sufficient
resources to deal with it in the receiving country. The Court therefore relied
on the fact that neither the applicant’s illness nor the inferior medical
facilities were caused by any act or omission of the receiving State or of any
non-State actors within the receiving State.
282. If the dire humanitarian conditions in Somalia were solely or even
predominantly attributable to poverty or to the State’s lack of resources to
deal with a naturally occurring phenomenon, such as a drought, the test in
N. v. the United Kingdom may well have been considered to be the
appropriate one. However, it is clear that while drought has contributed to
the humanitarian crisis, that crisis is predominantly due to the direct and
indirect actions of the parties to the conflict. The reports indicate that all
parties to the conflict have employed indiscriminate methods of warfare in
densely populated urban areas with no regard to the safety of the civilian
population (see paragraphs 82, 123, 127, 132, 137, 139-140 and 160,
above). This fact alone has resulted in widespread displacement and the
breakdown of social, political and economic infrastructures. Moreover, the
situation has been greatly exacerbated by al-Shabaab’s refusal to permit
international aid agencies to operate in the areas under its control, despite
the fact that between a third and a half of all Somalis are living in a situation
of serious deprivation (see paragraphs 125, 131, 169, 187 and 193, above).
283. Consequently, the Court does not consider the approach adopted in
N. v. the United Kingdom to be appropriate in the circumstances of the
present case. Rather, it prefers the approach adopted in M.S.S. v. Belgium
and Greece, which requires it to have regard to an applicant’s ability to
cater for his most basic needs, such as food, hygiene and shelter, his
vulnerability to ill-treatment and the prospect of his situation improving
within a reasonable time-frame (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited
above, § 254).
284. The reports indicate that the conditions for internally displaced
persons in southern and central Somalia are dire. Prior to the recent failure
of the rains, the reports indicated that over half of Somalia’s population was
dependent on food aid, and many of those people lived in the areas from
which the WFP had withdrawn (see paragraph 169, above). Two million
people, representing more than a quarter of the population of Somalia, faced
a humanitarian crisis (see paragraph 131, above). The United Nations
estimated that that figure had already risen to 2.4 million, nearly a third of
the population of Somalia, and that the situation would only deteriorate
68 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
further if the rains continued to fail (see paragraphs 193 and 194, above).
However, despite the humanitarian crisis, al-Shabaab continues to deny
international NGOs access to areas under its control (see paragraphs 94,
105, 117, 122, 141-142, 162, 169-170, 181-182 and 186, above).
285. The largest concentration of IDPs is in the Afgooye Corridor. It is
impossible to state with any degree of accuracy how many IDPs currently
live there, but the most recent estimates indicate that it may be as many as
410,000 people. It is exceptionally difficult for aid agencies to access the
corridor (see paragraphs 95, 122 and 143, above) and recent reports suggest
that IDPs are being forced to return to Mogadishu in search of food and
water (see paragraph 193, above). IDPs in the camps also appear to be
extremely vulnerable to exploitation and crime. Both adults and children
displaced in the Afgooye Corridor are being forcibly recruited to fight for
al-Shabaab (see paragraph 93, above) and there is a high prevalence of
sexual violence in the area (see paragraph 129, above).
286. The Government submitted that there is evidence of increased
urbanisation of the Afgooye Corridor. Although this assertion is supported
by a number of the country reports, it is not clear to the Court whether or
not urbanisation has improved conditions for the majority of IDPs. In fact,
some reports suggest that IDPs are experiencing increasing difficulties in
finding shelter in the Afgooye Corridor as landlords are either selling land
that IDPs live on or are charging rent that they cannot afford
(see paragraphs 95 and 189, above).
287. Unlike those in the Afgooye Corridor, NGOs have access to the
Dadaab camps in Kenya and both Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch have published detailed reports documenting the conditions there.
Both organisations reported the difficulties experienced by refugees in
reaching these camps following the closure of the Kenyan border
(see paragraphs 152, 171-174, above). In particular, there are numerous
reports of refugees being arbitrarily detained and/or abused by Kenyan
police officers (see paragraphs 153, 154 and 171-173, above), preyed upon
by criminal gangs (see paragraph 174, above), and in some cases being
returned to Somalia unless they agreed to pay a bribe (see paragraphs 153,
171 and 173, above).
288. Although UNHCR have a presence in the camps and humanitarian
assistance is available, the reports indicate that the camps are severely
overcrowded. The camps initially were intended to hold approximately
90,000 refugees but the most recent reports indicate that approximately
280,000 registered refugees are now living there (see paragraph 155,
above). As a result of the overcrowding, new refugees cannot build shelters
and instead have to stay with relatives and/or clan members (see paragraph
155, above). In addition, many refugees complain that the allocation of
water is insufficient as the water infrastructure was only designed for one
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 69
third of the number of people currently living in the camps (see paragraph
155, above).
289. There were also reports of insecurity within the camps, with high
levels of theft and sexual violence. This appeared to be in part due to a
minimal police presence (see paragraph 176, above) and in part due to
police inaction when confronted with reports of crime or sexual violence
(see paragraph 176, above). In addition, there were reports that the Kenyan
authorities had been taking advantage of vulnerable refugees by recruiting
them to fight for the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia
(see paragraph 157, above).
290. Both the report of Amnesty International and that of Human Rights
Watch indicated that refugees were not permitted to leave the camps, except
in exceptional circumstances, and refugees found outside the camps without
“movement passes” were arrested, fined and imprisoned for months at a
time (see paragraphs 158 and 177, above).
291. In light of the above, the Court considers that the conditions both in
the Afgooye Corridor and in the Dadaab camps are sufficiently dire to
amount to treatment reaching the threshold of Article 3 of the Convention.
IDPs in the Afgooye Corridor have very limited access to food and water,
and shelter appears to be an emerging problem as landlords seek to exploit
their predicament for profit. Although humanitarian assistance is available
in the Dadaab camps, due to extreme overcrowding access to shelter, water
and sanitation facilities is extremely limited. The inhabitants of both camps
are vulnerable to violent crime, exploitation, abuse and forcible recruitment.
Moreover, the refugees living in – or, indeed, trying to get to – the Dadaab
camps are also at real risk of refoulement by the Kenyan authorities. Finally,
the Court notes that the inhabitants of both camps have very little prospect
of their situation improving within a reasonable timeframe. The refugees in
the Dadaab camps are not permitted to leave and would therefore appear to
be trapped in the camps until the conflict in Somalia comes to an end. In the
meantime, the camps are becoming increasingly overcrowded as refugees
continue to flee the situation in Somalia. Although the IDPs in the Afgooye
Corridor are permitted to leave, in reality the only place they are able to
return to is Mogadishu, which the Court has found not to be a safe place for
the vast majority of civilians. Consequently, there is also little prospect of
their situation improving while the conflict continues.
292. Accordingly, the Court finds that any returnee forced to seek refuge
in either camp would be at real risk of Article 3 ill-treatment on account of
the dire humanitarian conditions. Although there is little information
regarding the situation in other IDP settlements in Somalia, from the
information that is available the Court sees little reason to believe that the
conditions there would be any better than those in the Afgooye Corridor or
in the Dadaab camps. If anything, the situation in those settlements is likely
to be worse as there has been less publicity concerning the plight of their
70 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
inhabitants and there is therefore even less chance that they might receive
humanitarian assistance.
6. Summary of the Court’s conclusions
293. In conclusion, the Court considers that the situation of general
violence in Mogadishu is sufficiently intense to enable it to conclude that
any returnee would be at real risk of Article 3 ill-treatment solely on
account of his presence there, unless it could be demonstrated that he was
sufficiently well connected to powerful actors in the city to enable him to
obtain protection (see paragraph 249, above).
294. Nevertheless, Article 3 does not preclude the Contracting States
from placing reliance on the internal flight alternative provided that the
returnee could travel to, gain admittance to and settle in the area in question
without being exposed to a real risk of Article 3 ill-treatment. In this regard,
the Court accepts that there may be parts of southern and central Somalia
where a returnee would not necessarily be at real risk of Article 3
ill-treatment solely on account of the situation of general violence
(see paragraph 270, above). However, in the context of Somalia, the Court
considers that this could only apply if the applicant had close family
connections in the area concerned, where he could effectively seek refuge.
If he has no such connections, or if those connections are in an area which
he could not safely reach, the Court considers that there is a likelihood that
he would have to have recourse to either an IDP or refugee camp
(see paragraph 266, above).
295. If the returnee’s family connections are in a region which is under
the control of al-Shabaab, or if it could not be accessed except through an
al-Shabaab controlled area, the Court does not consider that he could
relocate to this region without being exposed to a risk of ill-treatment unless
it could be demonstrated that he had recent experience of living in Somalia
and could therefore avoid coming to the attention of al-Shabaab
(see paragraph 276, above).
296. Where it is reasonably likely that a returnee would find himself in
an IDP camp, such as those in the Afgooye Corridor, or in a refugee camp,
such as the Dadaab camps in Kenya, the Court considers that there would be
a real risk that he would be exposed to treatment in breach of Article 3 on
account of the humanitarian conditions there (see paragraph 295, above).
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 71
7. Application of the aforementioned principles to the applicants’ cases
(a) The first applicant
α. The parties’ submissions
297. The first applicant submitted that he was at an enhanced risk of
torture and ill-treatment over and above that which arose solely from being
returned to Somalia on account of the fact that he was from a minority clan,
the Reer Hamar. He relied on the report of Dr Virginia Luling, prepared in
2007 in the course of the domestic proceedings, which concluded that, as
claimed, he belonged to the Benadiri Shanshiya (a sub-clan of the Reer
Hamar) on the basis of his knowledge of that clan, his dialect, his
appearance and on the basis of information provided by a third party
concerning the identity of his father. As a member of a minority clan whose
family had either fled persecution or been killed, he would be unable to
obtain any clan protection in Somalia. Moreover, as he had claimed asylum
in the United Kingdom at the age of sixteen, and had not lived in Somalia
for over seven years, he would be seen as a westernised outsider.
298. The first applicant further submitted that he would be unable to
cope on return as he suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(“PTSD”). He submitted a psychiatric report prepared by Dr Paul Monks, a
Consultant General and Forensic Psychiatrist, on 18 August 2008.
Dr Monks was of the opinion that the first applicant suffered PTSD which
was caused by witnessing the rape of his mother and the murder of his
father and sister at the hands of militia. His symptoms included evolving
depressive symptoms which were exacerbated by his imprisonment and the
uncertainty surrounding his future. His psychiatric problems had resulted in
repeated self-harm and suicidal acts, although it was noted that his PTSD
symptoms appeared to be partially resolving.
299. The Government did not accept that the first applicant had
conclusively demonstrated that he was a member of a minority clan.
Dr Luling had interviewed the applicant in August 2007, nearly four years
after his arrival in the United Kingdom and some two years after the
Adjudicator had rejected his claim that he was a member of the Reer Hamar.
The Government therefore submitted that he had had an opportunity to carry
out basic research into the Reer Hamar in the period before his interview
and the answers relied on by Dr Luling as demonstrating knowledge of the
sub-clan was all based on information which would have been in the public
domain. With regard to the first applicant’s dialect, Dr Luling did not
explain on what basis the interpreter was qualified to carry out an
assessment of the language used and she did not consider alternative
explanations for the mixture of Reer Hamar and general dialect allegedly
spoken by him. In particular, the Government relied on the report of the
72 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, which noted that other Somalis
growing up and living in the same neighbourhood as the Reer Hamar
probably also know and speak the Hamar dialect.
300. The Government also noted that the first applicant purported to
originate from Qoryoley, a small town to the south of Mogadishu in an area
currently controlled by al-Shabaab. In light of this and all the other recent
information, the Government submitted that the level of risk likely to be
faced by him if he were to travel from Mogadishu into central or southern
Somalia, and in particular to his home town, was not sufficient to constitute
a breach of Article 3 of the Convention.
β. The Court’s assessment
301. In view of its findings at paragraph 249, above, the Court finds that
if the first applicant were to remain in Mogadishu, there would be a real risk
that he would be subjected to Article 3 ill-treatment.
302. As the first applicant originates from Qoryoley, the Court accepts
that he might have close family who could support him there. However, the
town is currently under the control of al-Shabaab and, as the first applicant
arrived in the United Kingdom in 2003, when he was only sixteen years old,
the Court considers that there is a real risk he would be subjected to
Article 3 ill-treatment by al-Shabaab if he were to attempt to relocate there.
303. The evidence submitted to the Court does not suggest that he has
family elsewhere in southern and central Somalia. Consequently, as he
could not safely travel to Qoryoley, it is likely that he would find himself in
an IDP settlement such as the Afgooye Corridor or in a refugee camp such
as the Dadaab camps. The Court has already found that the conditions in
these camps are sufficiently dire to reach the Article 3 threshold and it notes
that the first applicant would be particularly vulnerable on account of his
psychiatric illness.
304. The Court therefore concludes that the removal of the first
applicant to Mogadishu would violate his rights under Article 3 of the
Convention.
(b) The second applicant
α The parties’ submissions
305. The second applicant submitted that he would be at increased risk
in areas controlled by al-Shabaab because he would be seen as westernised
and therefore anti-Islamic. He had arrived in the United Kingdom as a
young man and had spent his entire adult life there. He wore an earring,
which might lead to the perception that he was gay, he spoke little or no
Somali and he had a thoroughly “London” accent. Moreover, if it was
discovered that he had been a drug addict or thief then he would be liable to
double amputations or being publicly flogged or killed.
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 73
306. Even though he was from a majority clan, the applicant would be
unable to obtain protection as clan structures were breaking down and in
any case he no longer had any links to his clan. In addition, it was likely that
he would be conscripted to fight for al-Shabaab.
307. The Government submitted that as the second applicant was a
member of the Isaaq clan it was likely that, if returned to Mogadishu, he
would be able to make contact with, and receive assistance from, other
members of his clan. Although it was not clear whether the system of clan
protection was as strong in Mogadishu as it had been traditionally, it was
still a factor which could reduce further any potential risks to the second
applicant arising from the general security situation.
308. Moreover, the Government submitted that even if the second
applicant would face a real risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 of the
Convention if returned to Mogadishu, he was unlikely to face a similar level
of risk if he were to be returned to Hargeisa, the place of his birth. In this
regard, the Government noted that the Operational Guidance Note of
July 2010 indicated that people could travel by air between Mogadishu and
Hargeisa.
β. The Court’s assessment
309. In light of the Court’s findings at paragraph 249 above, it considers
that the second applicant would be at real risk of ill-treatment if he were to
remain in the city of Mogadishu. Although it was accepted that he was a
member of the majority Isaaq clan, the Court does not consider this to be
evidence of sufficiently powerful connections which could protect him in
Mogadishu.
310. It does not consider that he would be able to relocate safely within
southern and central Somalia. There is no evidence to suggest that he has
any close family connections in the region and, in any case, he arrived in the
United Kingdom in 1988, when he was nineteen years old. He has therefore
spent the last 22 years in the United Kingdom and, like the first applicant,
he has no experience of living under al-Shabaab’s repressive regime.
Consequently, the Court considers that he would be at real risk of Article 3
ill-treatment were he to seek refuge in an area under al-Shabaab’s control.
Likewise, there would be a real risk he would be subjected to Article 3
ill-treatment if he were to seek refuge either in the Afgooye Corridor or in
the Dadaab camps.
311. The Court recalls, however, that the second applicant was born in
Somaliland and has accepted that he is a member of the Isaaq clan.
The country information indicates that persons who originate from
Somaliland and/or have strong clan connections to the region, such as
members of the Isaaq clan, would be permitted to return there
(see paragraphs 79 and 103, above). Nevertheless, if the second applicant
could be admitted to Somaliland, it is not clear to the Court why he was
74 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
issued with removal directions to Mogadishu rather than Hargeisa, where
those originating from Somaliland have in the past been directly returned.
The fact that they have chosen not to do so appears to contradict their
assertion that he would be admitted there.
312. Accordingly, the Court is not satisfied that the second applicant
could travel to Hargeisa, gain admittance and settle there. It therefore
concludes that the removal of the second applicant to Mogadishu would also
violate Article 3 of the Convention.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
313. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols
thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to
the injured party.”
A. Damage
314. The applicants made no claim in respect of pecuniary and
non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
315. The first and second applicants initially claimed GBP 14,539.99
and GBP 4074.44 respectively for the costs and expenses incurred before
the Court. However, both claims were submitted to the Court out of time.
The applicants subsequently jointly claimed GBP 4545 in respect of the
supplementary observations submitted to the Court in October 2010.
316. The Government submitted that the first applicant’s claim for
GBP 14,539.99 was excessive, even allowing for the fact that the case was a
lead judgment on returns to Mogadishu.
317. In the circumstances of the present case, the Court has decided to
exercise its discretion to admit the applicants’ claims for just satisfaction.
318. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown
that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable
as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its
possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award
the first applicant the sum of EUR 14,500 for the proceedings before the
Court and the second applicant the sum of EUR 7,500 for the proceedings
before the Court.
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 75
C. Default interest
319. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should
be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
III. RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT
320. The Court recalls that, in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention, the present judgment will not become final until (a) the parties
declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the Grand
Chamber; or (b) three months after the date of the judgment, if reference of
the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested; or (c) the Panel of
the Grand Chamber rejects any request to refer under Article 43 of the
Convention.
321. It considers that the indication made to the Government under
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see above § 4) must continue in force until
the present judgment becomes final or until the Panel of the Grand Chamber
of the Court accepts any request by one or both of the parties to refer the
case to the Grand Chamber under Article 43 of the Convention.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Decides to join the applications;
2. Declares the applications under Article 3 of the Convention admissible;
3. Holds that the applicants’ removal to Somalia would violate Article 3 of
the Convention;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the first applicant, within three
months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in
accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 14,500 (fourteen
thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in
respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into British pounds at the
rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that the respondent State is to pay the second applicant, within three
months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in
accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 7,500 (seven
thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in
76 SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into British pounds at the
rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(c) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until
settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a
rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank
during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 28 June 2011, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fatoş AracıLech Garlicki
Deputy Registrar President
SUFI and ELMI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 77
Map provided by the Cartographic Section of the Departments of Peacekeeping
Operations and Field Support in UNHQ